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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON INFORMATION, INCOME, AND THE SHARING ECONOMY 
 
SEPTEMBER, 2015 
 
ANDERS FREMSTAD, B.S., GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Nancy Folbre 
 
Many privately-owned items are somewhat non-rival in consumption, so there are often benefits 
to borrowing and lending underutilized goods and exchanging used goods.  Although sharing is 
ubiquitous, it is understudied in economics.  This dissertation seeks to help develop an economics 
of sharing.   
Chapter 1 presents a simple mathematical model of the “gains from sharing”, which 
connects the literatures on club goods, household economies, collective action, community 
governance, and decentralized cooperation.  I argue that the level of sharing in society depends 
not just on technology but also on the norms that govern how people cooperate, on people’s 
preferences around privacy and independence, and on economies of scale in matching people 
with underutilized goods.  Since institutions that facilitate new forms of sharing are still gaining 
users, experimenting with rules and etiquette, and developing tastes for peer-to-peer interactions, 
the level of sharing is likely to increase in the years to come. 
Chapter 2 investigates the current and potential value of sharing goods across households.  
Analyzing unique data from the online platform NeighborGoods, I find that the level of sharing 
among relatives, friends and neighbors makes informal borrowing and lending an important 
component of inter-household cooperation.  The potential gains from sharing are even larger.  My 
investigation of consumer expenditures reveals that the average household spends over $9,000 a 
year on goods that could, in principle, be shared across households.  Given the large sums of 
money Americans spend on private vehicles, the greatest opportunities may be in increased ride-
sharing and car-sharing.  Finally, I address the relationship between income and sharing.  
Although traditional methods of sharing goods are disproportionately used by low-income people, 
I find that people of all incomes are equally likely to use new institutions for sharing goods, such 
as Craigslist, Airbnb, and Zipcar.  This suggests that new forms of sharing may maintain their 
popularity as incomes rise in the long run. 
Chapter 3 studies the effect of Craigslist’s market for secondhand goods on solid waste 
generation.  Economic theory suggests that falling transaction costs may increase incentives for 
owners to sell goods on secondhand markets and for buyers to purchase used goods instead of 
new goods.  I use difference-in-difference methods to estimate Craigslist’s effect on waste by 
exploiting a natural experiment in how the platform expanded across California and Florida 
between 1996 and 2009.  My results provide evidence that Craigslist led to substantial reductions 
in waste generation.  This paper suggests that other online platforms may similarly generate 
economic as well as environmental benefits. 
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CHAPTER 1 
QUASI-PUBLIC GOODS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE FUTURE OF SHARING 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Many goods are somewhat non-rival in consumption, and there can be “gains from 
sharing” these goods that are analogous to gains from trade.  People have historically shared a 
wide range of items, including lodging, vehicles, and tools, with their family, friends, and 
neighbors.  The internet has recently reduced the cost of sharing goods among strangers.  
Platforms like Craigslist, Airbnb, Couchsurfing, Zipcar, and RelayRides are changing how people 
borrow, lend, and exchange physical goods in a way that echoes how Wikipedia, YouTube, 
Twitter, and Facebook revolutionized how people share information.  By harnessing digital 
technologies, exploiting economies of scale, promoting cooperative norms, and developing pro-
sharing preferences, new institutions associated with the “sharing economy” may transform 
consumption patterns in the decades to come. 
Merriam-Webster defines “to share” as “to have or use something with others” or “to let 
someone else have or use a part of something that belongs to you”.  People freely share some 
goods, but in other cases the use of a good is determined by collective rules or market prices.  
There are so many ways to share a good over its lifetime that the best way to illustrate the breadth 
of the term may be to describe a hypothetical economy in which nothing is shared.  In such an 
economy, every individual owns everything they use.  Nothing is held in common, so families do 
not share homes, communities do not share parks, and nations do not share roads.  People do not 
borrow and lend goods, nor are there libraries, hotels, or rental markets.  When an individual no 
longer has any use for something, they discard the good rather than selling it on a secondhand 
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market or donating it to a charity.  Of course nothing like this world has ever existed, and an 
economy without any form of sharing would be extraordinarily wasteful.   
Although sharing is ubiquitous, it is under-studied in economics, even as it attracts 
growing attention from the popular media.  The Economist recently made “the rise of the sharing 
economy” its cover story (The Economist 2013).  Researchers have noted how new platforms for 
sharing could increase access to goods, build community, and reduce ecological damage 
(Agyeman et al. 2013, 14-19; Belk 2010, 729-730; Botsman and Rogers 2010; Schor 2010, 137-
143).  This paper focuses on the first claim, the economic case for sharing goods. 
Sharing generates value whenever the benefits of relaxing the private ownership of non-
rival goods exceed the costs.  The precise costs and benefits depend on a number of factors, 
including the degree of a good’s rivalry, the transaction cost of matching people with 
underutilized goods, the cost of enforcing cooperative behavior, the (un)pleasantness of social 
interactions, the value people place on economic independence, and the role of status in 
determining consumption.  It is an open question how the relative costs and benefits of sharing 
will evolve over time or whether people will share goods more or less in the years to come.  On 
the one hand, economic growth may blunt incentives for people to share goods.  On the other 
hand, new institutions may make it more convenient to share goods and facilitate a resurgence in 
sharing.  This paper makes the case that the future of sharing is bright. 
I start my analysis by reviewing the relevant literature on club goods, household 
economies, collective action, community governance, and decentralized cooperation.  Next, I 
present a simple mathematical model that specifies both the benefits and costs of sharing quasi-
public goods.  My theory stresses that equilibrium sharing levels depends on social as well as 
technological factors, and I apply this theoretical framework to understanding the sharing 
economy.  I argue that online platforms are likely to lead to greater sharing as they take advantage 
of economies of scale, promote cooperative norms, and develop pro-sharing preferences. 
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1.2 Literature review 
My review of the literature begins within neoclassical economics.  James Buchanan’s 
(1965) theory of clubs and Alejandrina Salcedo, Todd Schoellman, and Michèle Tertilt’s (2012) 
theory of households suggest that rational individuals automatically share goods at efficient 
levels.  Because neoclassical models assume that norms and preferences are exogenous and fixed, 
sharing is mainly a function of the good’s rivalry and the sharing technology.  Mancur Olson 
(1965) stresses the difficulty of providing collective goods in large groups.  Although Elinor 
Ostrom (1990) argues that close-knit communities can govern common goods efficiently, her 
principles for community governance are not met in the case of most quasi-public goods.  In 
contrast, Yochai Benkler (2004) contends that decentralized sharing among weakly connected 
individuals is an effective and increasingly important form of economic cooperation.  A closer 
look at these contending views will reveal the need to model both the costs and benefits of 
sharing quasi-public goods. 
 
1.2.1  Theory of clubs 
Buchanan’s groundbreaking 1965 paper, “An Economic Theory of Clubs”, opens by 
highlighting the pervasiveness of what I call quasi-public goods. 
As an extreme example, take a good normally considered to be purely private, 
say, a pair of shoes.  Clearly your own utility from a single pair of shoes, per unit 
of time, depends on the number of other persons who share them with you.  
Simultaneous physical sharing may not, of course, be possible; only one person 
can wear the shoes at each particular moment.  However, for any finite period of 
time, sharing is possible, even for such evidently private goods. (Buchanan 1965, 
3) 
Buchanan ultimately focuses on goods that are commonly shared through formal clubs, such as 
golf courses, but his analysis also applies to what Benkler calls shareable goods.  Like club 
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goods, shareable goods are excludable and non-rival, since people can take turns using them.  Of 
course most items in the real world fall somewhere between the pure categories of goods 
illustrated in Table 1.1.  Nevertheless, Buchanan’s work stresses that not all privately-owned 
goods are actually private goods.  In this paper, I will use the term quasi-public goods to refer to 
excludable goods that are at least partially non-rival in consumption. 
Buchanan assumes that clubs accept new members until the cost of sharing the good with 
the marginal member exceeds the benefit of sharing the expense with the marginal member 
(Buchanan 1965, 5).  The cost of sharing can be negative in some domains, due to camaraderie 
(Sandler and Tschirhardt 1980).  However, in equilibrium it must cost current members 
something to share the good with an additional member.  (If it did not, a profit-maximizing club 
would admit another member without reducing the fees paid by current members.)  This model 
suggests that the market will guide individuals to share some goods efficiently through clubs.  It 
is fairly straight-forward to generalize Buchanan’s theory to other forms of sharing.  For example, 
rational owners should rent underutilized goods to their peers whenever the benefit to the 
borrower – measured in dollars – exceeds the cost to the lender.  From this perspective, the 
thinness of peer-to-peer rental markets suggests that the gains from sharing these goods are slim. 
Salcedo, Schoellman, and Tertilt’s 2012 paper “Families as Roommates” essentially 
describes households as clubs.  In their model, people live together if the benefit of sharing the 
expense of household public goods outweighs the time cost of “forming and maintaining 
relationships” with each of their housemates.  (Without such a cost, utility-maximizing 
individuals would share a single, enormous household.)  Salcedo et al. calibrate their model to fit 
data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), which shows that people with higher 
incomes tend to live in smaller households and spend a smaller proportion of their incomes on 
household public goods.  Their calibrated model is fairly consistent with established household 
equivalence scales.  For example, it suggests that two median-income adults who live together are 
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about 12 percent better off than their single peers earning the same income (Salcedo et al. 2012, 
Table 5). 
Buchanan’s theory of clubs and Salcedo et al.’s theory of households assume that 
individuals share goods when the benefits outweigh the costs, which implies that prevailing levels 
of sharing are always efficient.  Although their models highlight the costs of sharing, they ignore 
how these costs might change.  In fact, after calibrating their model using current CES data, 
Salcedo et al. argue that income growth explains 37 percent of the decline in the number of adults 
(and 16 percent of the decline in the number of children) in the average household  from 1850 
until 2000 (Salcedo et al. 2013, 153).  Their claim rests on the heroic assumption that the amount 
of time it took to maintain relationships with each housemate remained constant for one hundred 
and fifty years, while the opportunity cost of that time increased with wages. 
However, it seems likely that the costs of sharing a home increased due to gradual shifts 
in norms and preferences.  For example, the norms that clearly defined individuals’ rights and 
responsibilities within multi-generational households may have deteriorated over time.  
Preferences against living with non-relatives may have also developed endogenously, as children 
increasingly grew up in single-family households.  It is, therefore, unclear to what extent the 
historical decline in household size is an optimal response to higher incomes, and to what extent 
prevailing norms and preferences make it more difficult to share housing today than it did in the 
past.  For similar reasons, I will argue that sharing among strangers is likely to increase in the 
future.  As people gain experience borrowing, lending, and exchanging goods on new online 
platforms, they will likely develop norms and preferences that are conducive to these new forms 
of cooperation. 
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1.2.2 Community governance 
Not all economists are optimistic that individuals will form clubs, households, or other 
institutions to efficiently share goods.  Olson’s 1965 Logic of Collective Action emphasizes the 
difficulty of sharing a collective good.  He argues that in groups of rational, self-interested 
individuals, no member receives the full benefit of their marginal contribution to the group, so all 
members will do too little to promote the group’s interests (Olson 1965).  In the context of quasi-
public goods, Olson’s argument suggests that individuals will rarely place their privately-owned 
goods in the commons, even if the collective benefit would exceed their private cost.  His theory 
implies that large groups face the greatest challenge of advancing their collective interest, since 
each member’s share of the group benefits will tend to decline with group size. 
In her 1990 book Governing the Commons, Ostrom argues that groups can and do share 
some goods effectively.  However, she finds that enduring institutions for sharing common goods 
are characterized by seven design principles, including clearly defined boundaries, established 
appropriation rules, and collective participation in setting those rules (Ostrom 1990, 90).  When 
these design principles are absent, community governance fails.  As such, community governance 
does not provide a solution for allocating many quasi-public goods, because privately-owned 
items are dispersed and heterogeneous, making it impractical for a community to set and enforce 
universal rules governing their use. 
 
1.2.3 Decentralized sharing 
Benkler draws attention to forms of sharing that are distinct from both Buchanan’s clubs 
and Ostrom’s community governance.  The legal scholar’s 2004 article “Sharing Nicely: On 
Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as Modality of Economic Production,” focuses 
on environments in which loosely-connected individuals successfully share goods in a 
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decentralized manner.  Benkler distinguishes shareable goods from club goods and common pool 
resources because they are “mid-grained”.  Unlike large-grained goods such as golf courses and 
irrigation systems, mid-grained goods are owned by many individuals.  However, unlike fine-
grained goods such as coffee and paper, mid-grained goods can only be acquired in discrete 
quantities, which leads to an excess capacity of shareable goods (Benkler 2004, 297).   
Benkler turns to two case studies to make the case for decentralized sharing.  First he 
describes the system of “slugging” in which drivers transport riders between established locations 
free of charge.  By sharing the trip, “slugs” get a free ride, and “body snatchers” get to drive in 
the less-congested High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes.  Slugging emerged organically in 
Northern Virginia when HOV lanes were created there in the 1970s.  Over time, slugs and body 
snatchers have developed norms that reduce the social cost of sharing, including: first come first 
served; no talking (unless everyone wants to talk); no payment; no eating; and the slug line does 
not leave a woman alone at night (Slugging Etiquette). 
Another example of decentralized sharing is SETI@home, a network of millions of 
personal computers that make up the largest virtual supercomputer in the world (Benkler 2004, 
291).  SETI@home takes large problems related to the search for extraterrestrial life and breaks 
them into small parts that can be solved by personal computers.  Volunteers contribute to this 
project by installing a program on their computers that automatically solves these problems when 
the computer is idle. 
These cases illustrate how sharing privately-owned goods like vehicles and computers 
can increase their utilization at little cost to owners.  Benkler specifically contrasts decentralized 
sharing with Ostrom’s notion of community governance.  He addresses arguments made by Sam 
Bowles and Herb Gintis that the community governance works because it provides people with 
background knowledge about other participants, repeat interactions that create incentives to 
cooperate, and rules for enforcing cooperative behavior. 
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‘Community governance’… gains robustness because it involves tightly 
connected social groups.  But social sharing is a broader phenomenon, one that 
includes cooperative enterprises that can be pursued by weakly connected 
participants or even by total strangers and yet function as a sustainable and 
substantial modality of economic production.  Indeed, in the context of the 
digitally networked environment, it is this type of sharing and cooperative 
production among strangers and weakly connected participants that holds the 
greatest economic promise (Benkler 2004, 333-4). 
Benkler stresses the “fluidity” of participation in slugging and SETI@home.  These institutions 
require a much lower level of commitment than community governance.  Benkler acknowledges 
that these forms of cooperation may be less attractive to “communitarians”, who prefer the forms 
of cooperation found in communes or Amish communities.  But he contends that this fluidity 
makes these decentralized institutions attractive to “many more people” so that they are “likely to 
be more economically effective and efficient on a larger scale” (Benkler 2004, 343).  In sharp 
contrast to Olson, Benkler argues that bigger groups can be more effective at sharing goods 
because they do not place heavy burdens on their members (Benkler 2004, 342-344). 
 
1.3 Theory 
Although scholars disagree on the relative benefits and costs of sharing goods, a simple 
model may clarify the opportunities and challenges noted by Buchanan, Olson, Ostrom, and 
Benkler.  Assume first that the utility that individual, i, derives from costlessly sharing a quasi-
public good, g, with n-1 other people can be expressed by a simple equation: 
𝑢𝑖 =
g
𝑛𝑎
      (1) 
in which a is a measure of the good’s non-rivalry or shareability.  For quasi-public goods, 0<a<1.  
When a=1, the good is perfectly private, there are no potential benefits from sharing it, and each 
individual would be equally well off with their per capita share, 
𝑔
𝑛
.  When a=0, the good is a pure 
public good.  In the real world, many goods are quasi-public, including housing, vehicles, tools, 
and toys, and there can be gains from sharing these types of goods with others. 
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Economists tacitly acknowledge the importance of quasi-public goods when they use 
household equivalence scales to compare the incomes of households of different sizes.  For 
example, the common square root scale implies that a household with four people needs only 
twice as much income as a single-person household to attain the same standard of living.  Of 
course, households spend their income on a range of goods.  Some of the goods purchased by 
households are more shareable than others - i.e. furniture is less rival than food.  The square root 
scale suggests that on average a=0.5, or that: 
𝑢𝑖 =
𝑌
𝑛0.5
=
∑ 𝑝𝑔𝑞𝑔
𝑘
𝑔=1
𝑛0.5
    (2) 
where all household income, Y, is spent on goods 1…k.  Although a wide range of studies use 
household equivalence scales to compare incomes across households, they provide incomplete 
models of sharing.  Equations 1 and 2 recognize the benefit but ignore the cost of sharing goods. 
To share goods in groups, individuals must create rules and norms that ensure that all 
members benefit at least somewhat from sharing.  It may take time for members to learn to share 
goods effectively, just as it may take time for them to learn to enjoy it.  This coordination and 
development can be costly.  A related problem with the above equations is that they implicitly 
assume that all individuals provide equal contributions and make equal use of the quasi-public 
good when in fact sharing may be rife with distributional conflict.  Equation 2 models household 
members as altruists, but individuals often have different interests.  The task of equitably sharing 
goods is probably even more difficult in other contexts.  Consider the potential problems for a 
neighborhood car-sharing coop.  The average American car is driven about one hour a day, so it 
is a good example of an expensive quasi-public good with a fairly low a.  Households could, in 
principle, save money by contributing their vehicle(s) to a neighborhood coop in exchange for the 
right to borrow a neighbor’s car when they need an additional vehicle or a different type of 
vehicle.  However, households’ net benefits from car-sharing will depend on the quantity and 
quality of vehicles they contribute, the frequency with which they borrow neighbors’ cars, at what 
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times they borrow others’ vehicles, and how carefully they drive.  Without creating and enforcing 
a number of rules, there is no guarantee that all households will benefit from the cooperative 
effort. 
If a group adopts an egalitarian institution in which everyone makes equal contributions 
and withdrawals to the quasi-public good, then: 
𝑢𝑖 =
𝑛𝑔
𝑛𝑎
− g − 𝑐(𝑛)    (3) 
where each member contributes g to the group, the shareability of the good is given by a, and the 
cost of sharing the good, c, depends partly on the size of the group, n.  In practice, it is difficult to 
distinguish the shareability of a good, a, from the cost of sharing it, c.  In my discussion, I will 
present the shareability of a good, a, as if it is determined solely by technical qualities of the 
good.  In contrast, I will describe the cost of sharing a good, c, as a function of a broad range of 
factors, including the technology used to facilitate cooperation, the rules and norms in the group, 
and members’ preferences for sharing.   
Olson’s Logic provides a theory for why the cost of sharing may increase sharply in 
group size, or why c’(n) is large.  On the other hand, Benkler’s treatise on shareable goods argues 
the opposite, that c’(n) is small.  Salcedo et al. (2012) stake out a position somewhere in the 
middle and assume that the cost of sharing household public goods increases linearly with 
household size, because it takes a fixed amount of time for someone to maintain a workable 
relationship with each other member of the household.  I assume only that c(n)>0 and that the 
exact structure of the cost of sharing depends on institutions, social norms, and individual 
preferences. 
Since there is a cost to sharing a good with the additional person in Equation 3, there is 
also an optimal number of people with whom to share.  In some cases, there is no net benefit to 
sharing a quasi-public good, in which case it will remain private.  When the benefit does exceed 
the costs, differentiating ui with respect to n reveals the optimal group size: 
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𝑛∗ = (
(1−𝑎)𝑔
𝑐′(𝑛)
)
1
𝑎
     (4) 
From this result we see clearly that 
𝑑𝑛∗
𝑑𝑎
< 0, or that optimal group size is smaller for a good that 
is less shareable.  Similarly 
𝑑𝑛∗
𝑑𝑐′(𝑛)
< 0 and optimal group size decreases with the cost of 
admitting an additional person into the group, c’(n).  How exactly the cost of sharing, c, varies 
with the number of people, n, depends on a number of factors, including technology as well as the 
rules, norms and preferences within a group. 
 At any point in time people use a variety of institutions to share a wide range of goods.  
To some degree, these institutions are substitutes for one another.  For example, an individual 
may share a hundred books with their family members using a common bookshelf and a hundred 
thousand books with their fellow citizens using a public library.  If they borrow a book from the 
library that they really enjoy, they may purchase it and add it to the household collection.  I 
classify institutions for sharing goods along three dimensions: 
 Institutions for exchanging goods vs. institutions for borrowing and lending 
goods 
 Centralized institutions vs. decentralized institutions 
 Market institutions vs. non-market institutions 
Common forms of sharing can be organized in a 2∗2∗2 matrix.  Table 1.2 provides examples of 
all eight types of institutions.  Some sharing arrangements, like public libraries, fit Equation 3 
quite neatly.  The case for public libraries is that the benefit of sharing ng books with n people 
exceeds the cost, c, of building the library, paying a librarian, teaching patrons how to behave and 
so on.  Equation 3 fits other methods of sharing less well, but the basic logic still holds.  For 
example, there are clear gains from sharing children’s dress clothes.  Households may do this by 
passing hand-me-downs to younger siblings, donating used clothing to charity, or selling items at 
garage sales or on Craigslist.  The shareability of the clothing, a, depends on its durability, while 
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the costs of sharing, c, depends on how it is shared.  The gains from sharing may not be 
distributed equally, as Equation 3 assumes, but everyone usually receives some benefit from 
sharing the good.  Even in the case of giving used clothing to charity, donators get a reduction in 
clutter and a tax write-off.  When used clothes are sold on the secondhand markets, the gains are 
split between the buyer and seller.  Although markets do not ensure that gains from sharing are 
equally distributed, they do generally benefit both buyers and sellers or borrowers and lenders.  
While Equation 3 does not explain the distribution of gains from sharing, it does suggest that the 
overall level of sharing will decrease in a and c’(n). 
 With some minor modifications, Equation 3 can also be used to determine how many 
times individuals will use a particular institution for sharing goods.  Whereas n originally 
represented the number of people making equal contributions and use of the quasi-public good, it 
can also represent the number of instances in which individual, i, engages in a particular mode of 
sharing.  Again, there are benefits as well as costs to using any sharing institution, and individuals 
arguably choose how often they carpool to work or peruse garage sales in much the same way 
they decide how many people to live with. 
 
1.4 The sharing economy 
My simple model of the benefits and costs of sharing provides a theoretical basis for 
understanding recent developments in how people share goods.  Online platforms have lowered 
the cost of sharing goods with the marginal person, and in doing so they facilitate cooperation 
among much larger groups.  By centralizing information on the availability of quasi-public goods, 
platforms have sharply reduced the amount of time it takes to locate an underutilized item to buy, 
borrow, or rent.  Websites also provide feedback mechanisms and promote norms and preferences 
that facilitate sharing and punish opportunism.  Many online platforms rely heavily on markets to 
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share goods.  While introducing money to the practice may undermine some of the solidarity that 
group members feel for one another (Willer et al. 2012), markets may also encourage individuals 
to share goods with more people since they provide benefits to people on both sides of one-time 
transactions. 
In terms of Equation 3, new institutions for sharing goods have changed the structure of 
the cost of sharing many important items, c(n), so that it no longer increases much with the 
number of people in i‘s group or the number of transactions i conducts.  For example, once 
someone learns to use Craigslist - to read and write posts, to deal with other users, to avoid scams 
- there is little cost to engaging in the marginal transaction as a either a buyer or seller.  Compare 
this to the cost of buying or selling the marginal good at a garage sale.  To the extent that online 
platforms have reduced c’(n), they have also probably led to an increase in n*, the number of 
people per group, or the number of people that i transacts with on the platform. 
In many cases, online platforms represent a clear improvement over traditional 
institutions for sharing.  Craigslist and eBay allow people to purchase specific secondhand items 
from thousands of strangers instead of relying solely on discards from family and friends.  Airbnb 
and Couchsurfing help travelers find hosts anywhere in the world rather than tracking down 
distant relatives or friends-of-friends.  Fluid networks of loosely-connected individuals often out-
perform closely-knit communities in sharing the benefits of quasi-public goods.  Economic theory 
predicts that people are less likely to cooperate in one-time interactions than in repeat 
interactions, but the success of online platforms suggests that sharing with strangers can be less 
costly than sharing with close family and friends, as Benkler argues.  Perhaps the reason is that 
when things go badly one can quickly cut weak ties but not strong ties.  The key to the sharing 
economy might be that it allows people to share goods without necessarily building long-term 
relationships. 
The sharing economy aims to match people with quasi-public goods more effectively 
than informal networks of relatives, friends, and neighbors.  Online platforms facilitate sharing in 
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three ways: they organize information about goods that a large number of members would like to 
share, they provide feedback mechanisms and norms that encourage cooperative behavior, and 
they work to develop preferences for sharing.  Consider how NeighborGoods and Couchsurfing 
encourage people to share durable goods and lodging with strangers.   
Members of NeighborGoods can post items they would like to share to their inventories, 
and they can search local inventories for items they would like to borrow.  If a member cannot 
find an item they would like to borrow, they can post it to their wish list.  If someone requests to 
borrow a certain good, and the lender agrees, the borrower agrees to follow the “three golden 
rules of sharing” and arranges to pick up the good at a mutually-convenient time and place.  
When the transaction is complete, the lender may rate and comment on the borrower, and the 
borrower may rate and comment on both the lender and the good. 
Couchsurfing similarly organizes information and provides feedback mechanisms to help 
travelers find free places to stay all around the world.  The website also stresses the advantages of 
connecting with other members, traveling like a local, and fostering cultural exchange 
(Couchsurfing 2015 “About”).  General reciprocity is vital to Couchsurfing, since direct 
reciprocity is only possible if two members travel to each other’s home cities – an unlikely 
coincidence of wants.  That said, 12 to 18 percent of Couchsurfing stays were directly 
reciprocated between 2004 and 2008, suggesting that Couchsurfing experiences often lead to new 
friendships (Lauterbach, Truong Shah and Adamic. 2009, 348).  A challenge for Couchsurfing is 
getting would-be users to recognize that the costs of sharing lodging may be much lower than 
they think. 
My theory suggests that online platforms increase the gains from sharing by reducing the 
cost of borrowing, lending, and exchanging quasi-public goods on decentralized networks of 
loosely-connected individuals.  However, as my descriptions of NeighborGoods and 
Couchsurfing reveal, minimizing the costs of sharing consists of more than simply centralizing 
information about the availability of non-rival goods.  Platforms must work to build effective 
 15 
feedback mechanisms, develop norms, and mold preferences to facilitate sharing.  Paradoxically, 
the difficulty of facilitating new forms of sharing is what leads me to argue that the practice will 
increase in the years to come. 
 
1.5 The future of sharing 
Next, I consider the future of online platforms like Craigslist, NeighborGoods, and 
Couchsurfing.  My analysis begins with the recognition that there are huge stocks of quasi-public 
goods in the United States today.  The rivalry or shareability of a good, a, depends largely on its 
utilization.  Fully-utilized goods are completely rival, but there are potential gains from sharing 
underutilized goods.  The utilization of goods varies greatly, even for very similar goods.  Recall 
Buchanan’s example of shoes.  Formal shoes are fairly shareable, because people wear them only 
on special occasions.  Casual shoes are not very shareable, because people tend to wear them 
every day.  The gains from sharing a good depend on its utilization over its entire lifetime.  Some 
rarely-used goods are fully depreciated by the time they are discarded.  We brush our teeth for a 
few minutes a day, so we could, in principle, share toothbrushes (Frank 2010, 576).  However, 
since we use toothbrushes until they are worn out, toothbrushes are not underutilized, and there 
are no gains from sharing them. 
There is little accurate data on utilization rates, but existing data suggests that many 
goods are surprisingly unused.  The average power drill is reportedly used for just a few minutes 
over its lifetime (Botsman and Rogers 2010, 83).  Assuming that these drills could operate for 
dozens of hours, the lifetime utilization rate of privately-owned drills may be less than one 
percent.  The utilization rates of more expensive goods can also be surprisingly low.  Average 
vehicle occupancy in the United States is 1.7 (Santos et al. 2011, 33), which means the utilization 
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rate is about 33 percent when private vehicles are in use.1  Moreover, private vehicles are driven a 
bit less than one hour a day, or 4 percent of the time (Santos et al. 2011, 7, 31).  Vehicles would 
depreciate more rapidly if they were driven more often, but doubling a vehicle’s annual mileage 
does not double its rate of depreciation.  The effective lifetime utilization rate of the average 
privately-owned vehicle may be around 25 percent.  Low utilization rates suggest that there may 
be substantial opportunities for greater sharing of quasi-public goods.  Indeed, the 
underutilization of a nation’s consumer goods represents a form of waste similar to the 
underutilization of a nation’s capital and labor stocks, as measured by the rate of capacity 
utilization.   
However, within the context of Equation 3, the lack of sharing is efficient if the marginal 
cost of sharing with one more person, c’(n), exceeds the marginal benefit of making better use of 
quasi-public goods.  Moreover, there is no reason to expect equilibrium levels of sharing to rise 
unless costs fall.  If the cost of sharing is determined solely by technology, then we have already 
realized the potential gains from online platforms.  In 2014, 55 percent of Americans exchanged 
secondhand goods on websites like Craigslist, 10 percent used peer-to-peer platforms like Airbnb 
or Couchsurfing, and 9 percent shared cars using services like Zipcar or RelayRides (Center for a 
New American Dream 2014), but the sharing economy has not dramatically increased utilization 
rates or radically transformed consumption patterns.  To some degree, online platforms have 
probably just crowded-out other institutions for sharing goods.  If the costs of sharing are 
exogenous and unchanging, then sharing is unlikely to grow. 
I make three theoretical arguments for why equilibrium levels of sharing will probably 
increase substantially in the years to come.  Setting aside the possibility that further technical 
advances will make sharing more convenient, there is good reason to think that over time people 
                                                     
1 Assuming five-seat cars 
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and institutions will make better use of existing sharing technologies.  The sharing economy may 
facilitate substantially high levels of sharing if platforms can take advantage of economies of 
scale, if norms are sticky and adjust slowly to the advent of new technologies, and if preferences 
are endogenous and people must develop their taste for sharing.  I provide some evidence that 
online platforms are working to address each of these challenges.  While it is impossible to 
estimate the effect of each factor on equilibrium levels of sharing, together they suggest that there 
is considerable potential for increased sharing. 
 
1.5.1 Economies of scale 
The analysis so far has ignored the likely possibility that there are returns to scale in 
sharing goods.  I have argued that the sharing economy has reduced the cost of sharing a good 
with one more person, c’(n).  However, the cost of sharing a quasi-public goods on a sparse 
network is likely to be quite high.  As an extreme example, an online platform with two users will 
facilitate very few transactions, even if both members own a number of highly shareable goods 
(with low a).  Among the reasons for this is that each user may not have the type of good that the 
other needs, their goods may not be available for use at the right time, and they may not live in 
close proximity to one another.  If there are economies of scale in matching people with shareable 
goods, then c’(n) declines with n until a critical mass of people is using a particular platform to 
share a good.  As a result, there may be tipping points in which people move from low levels of 
sharing to high levels of sharing quickly, without any change in technology, norms, or 
preferences. 
Different platforms face different challenges in building a critical mass of users.  
Economies of scale may explain why peer-to-peer lodging platforms like Airbnb and 
Couchsurfing have been among the most successful sharing economy platforms to date.  Even 
 18 
though most people may be wary of hosting or staying with strangers, these platforms do not 
require a large number of users in any given city to be useful.  On the contrary, the networks were 
able to effectively match travelers with local hosts even when there were just a handful of users in 
major cities.  That is not to say that there are no economies to scale in peer-to-peer lodging.  Now 
that many more people use the platforms -- ten percent of Americans reported using one of these 
platforms in the previous year (Center for a New American Dream 2014) -- it may be easier to 
find lodging in more locations and to generate better matches between guests and hosts.  
However, the global nature of peer-to-peer lodging platforms made it relatively easy for them to 
achieve the necessary economies of scale to succeed. 
Platforms that facilitate local forms of sharing can face much greater difficulties in 
building a critical mass of users.  NeighborGoods allows people to share household goods, such 
as tools, gear, and media.  As noted above, the platform makes it very easy to search other 
member’s inventories.  However, there are no gains to sharing most goods unless users live in 
close proximity to one another.  If the borrower has to travel across town to borrow a quasi-public 
good like a lawnmower or a tent, then the cost will likely exceed the benefit.  In my survey of 
NeighborGoods users, 71 percent of respondents report that they do not borrow more items 
because there are not enough users in their area (see Section 2.2.1 and Appendix A for survey 
details).  Indeed, this was the single most-cited reason users gave for not making better use of 
NeighborGoods. 
Economies of scale may also explain the lack of widespread car sharing in the United 
States.  The extreme underutilization of private vehicles suggests there are huge potential gains 
from borrowing and lending privately-owned cars.  Peer-to-peer platforms like RelayRides allow 
people to rent out their cars when they do not need them.  If enough people used these sorts of 
services, many Americans might have access to a neighbor’s car 24 hours a day.  However, 
currently most local car-sharing markets are thin, so it is usually easier for people to take mass 
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transit, rent a car from a rental company, or buy their own car -- even if it will only be used a few 
hours a week. 
While online platforms face real difficulties in achieving a critical mass of users, the 
returns to scale in matching people with underutilized goods suggests that equilibrium levels of 
sharing are likely to increase over time.  Once platforms reach a certain tipping point, they may 
expand quickly as additional users reduce the marginal cost of sharing and attract even more 
users.  There is already historical precedent for platforms attempting to facilitate local forms of 
sharing.  In 2014, 31 percent of Americans reported using an online markets for secondhand 
goods such as Craigslist at least monthly, compared with the 43 percent of people who use thrift 
stores and garage sales on a monthly basis (Center for a New American Dream 2014).  If there 
are economies to scale on online platforms, existing technologies may facilitate substantially 
greater sharing in the years to come. 
 
1.5.2 Sticky norms 
A second reason for why people are likely to share more is that norms are sticky or slow 
to change, so that it will take time for the designers and users of online platforms to fully harness 
current technologies.  The cost of sharing a quasi-public good with the marginal person, c’(n), 
depends fundamentally on the norms within a group, including the level of trust between 
members, the clarity of social scripts, the etiquette around a particular mode of sharing, and the 
ability to punish malfeasance.  It would be a mistake to assume that we have already developed 
the ideal norms for sharing goods among fluid networks of loosely-connected individuals. 
Buchanan and Salcedo et al. explicitly recognize the cost of sharing goods, but they 
unrealistically assume that these costs are exogenous and fixed.  The internet has substantially 
reduced the transaction costs of finding quasi-public goods to borrow, rent, or purchase, but it has 
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probably not yet shifted norms to minimize the cost of sharing.  In the same way that norms that 
reduced the cost of living in multi-generational households gradually eroded as more children 
grew up in homes without their grandparents, norms that reduce the cost of sharing goods with 
strangers will probably develop slowly as more people use online platforms. 
Online platforms try to foster norms to facilitate greater sharing, in the same way that 
“slugs” and “body snatchers” developed an etiquette to facilitate casual carpooling.  For example, 
when someone requests to borrow a good from another member on NeighborGoods, the website 
asks the borrower to agree to the “three golden rules of sharing: play nice, treat other people’s 
stuff the way you’d want your stuff to be treated, and show up on time.”  In the context of my 
theoretical framework, fostering friendliness, carefulness, and punctuality reduces the cost of 
sharing a good with the marginal member, c’(n).  Similarly, Zipcar asks its users keep their 
vehicles clean, transport pets in carriers, and promptly report a car that is dirty, damaged, or with 
low fuel (Zipcar 2015).  Craigslist encourages users to avoid scams by making deals locally and 
face-to-face (Craigslist “Avoiding Scams” 2015). 
Online platforms have not yet fostered the ideal norms for peer-to-peer sharing, but the 
plethora of sites ensures steady experimentation as platforms compete for users.  This competition 
is not entirely zero-sum.  Promoting cooperative norms benefits all online platforms that facilitate 
peer-to-peer sharing.  Sticky norms provide a powerful argument for why the costs of sharing 
goods will likely decline over time due to “learning-by-doing”.  As people and platforms develop 
better norms around sharing goods on fluid networks, those new forms of sharing are likely to 
grow in importance. 
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1.5.3 Endogenous preferences 
A third reason for why levels of sharing are likely to increase over time is that 
preferences are endogenous.  Just as people may learn to share by sharing, they may develop a 
taste for sharing by borrowing, lending, and exchanging quasi-public goods.  The cost of sharing, 
c(n), surely depends on preferences, including the value people place on status, privacy, 
flexibility, and independence.  It is a mistake to assume that these preferences are exogenous or 
fixed, because people’s preferences around sharing will likely adapt to new technologies and 
institutions over time. 
Economists have long been wary of arguments for how shifts in preferences can drive 
behavior.  Bowles (1998) argues that while this reluctance to consider endogenous preferences 
“expresses a prudent antipathy toward paternalistic attempts at social engineering of the psyche, it 
modestly acknowledges how little we know about the effects of economic structure and policy on 
preferences, and it erects a barrier both to ad hoc explanation and to the utopian thinking” the 
notion that preferences are exogenous and fixed is not very realistic (Bowles 1998, 102).  
Reviewing a broad literature in experimental economics as well as sociology, anthropology, and 
history, Bowles presents a persuasive argument that markets have molded individuals’ 
preferences by framing choices, crowding-out intrinsic motivations, and changing the process of 
cultural transmission (Bowles 1998, 77). 
New institutions for sharing goods may similarly change preferences around status, 
privacy, flexibility, and independence.  For example, by stressing the value of “access” over 
“ownership”, the sharing economy may reduce the status that comes with owning underutilized 
goods (see Heffetz and Frank (2008) for an overview of positional goods).  Similarly, car-sharing 
and ride-sharing platforms may gradually change people’s perceptions of the supposed 
convenience and freedom of owning a private vehicle.  Peer-to-peer platforms may also transform 
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our understanding of what it means to be economically independent and demonstrate that 
equitable sharing can further both individual and collective goals. 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to greater sharing is that many people have little interest in 
getting to know people with whom they can share.  In my survey of NeighborGoods users, 
“meeting new people” is by far the weakest motivation for joining the platform, after “reducing 
waste”, “saving money”, “helping others”, and “building community”.  As noted above this 
hesitation towards dealing with strangers may decline as people develop better norms and social 
scripts around sharing.  Meeting new people may also become less stressful when people realize 
that the vast majority of interactions are pleasant and that when interactions are unpleasant it is 
easy to terminate the relationship and report any uncooperative behavior to the group.  The best 
argument for sharing may be that it occasionally introduces people to new friends.  In a sense, 
friendship is the ultimate endogenous preference.  It takes time to “make” a new friend and, 
whatever one’s view of love, there is no such thing as “friendship as first sight”.  Over time 
online platforms may help people recognize the endogeneity of this preference.  For example, 
Couchsurfing promises new members “you have friends all over the world, you just haven’t met 
them yet” (Couchsurfing “How it Works”).   
As in the arguments concerning economies of scale and sticky norms, it is impossible to 
quantify how changing preferences will affect equilibrium levels of sharing.  Although there is 
good reason to believe that people do compare the marginal benefits and costs of sharing quasi-
public goods, we cannot decompose c(n) to account for the relative importance of a group’s size, 
density, norms, and values in determining how much people share.  Instead the purpose of this 
section is to highlight how economies of scale, sticky norms, and endogenous preferences affect 
levels of sharing now and in the future.  Recognizing these factors should dispel any notion that 
equilibrium levels of sharing are necessarily efficient or stable.  Even in the absence of further 
technological innovations, there are good reasons to think that people will share goods more, not 
less, in the years to come. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
Economic theory recognizes both the costs and the benefits of sharing goods.  In a simple 
model, improved technology for borrowing and lending items leads immediately to an increase in 
the level of sharing.  However, this paper argues that it takes time for new institutions to exploit 
economies of scale, shift sticky norms, and mold endogenous preferences.  As a result, we should 
expect the role of sharing to grow, as people build a critical mass of sharers, create a new set of 
rules and etiquette, and develop their tastes for borrowing, lending, and exchanging items on fluid 
networks of loosely-connected individuals.  My analysis provides support for Benkler’s (2004) 
argument that going forward sharing will be an increasingly important “modality of economic 
production”. 
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1.7 Tables and figures 
 
Table 1.1: Taxonomy of goods 
 Excludable Non-excludable 
Rival private goods common goods 
Non-Rival 
 
club goods, 
shareable goods 
public goods 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2: Institutions for sharing 
 Exchange  Borrowing and lending 
 Centralized Decentralized  Centralized Decentralized 
      
Market 
thrift stores, 
pawn shops 
garage sales, 
Craigslist, 
eBay 
 
rental stores, 
Zipcar, 
Netflix 
Airbnb, 
RelayRides, 
Blablacar 
      
Non-
market 
free stores, 
clothing 
swaps 
Freecycle, 
“borrowing” a 
cup of sugar 
 
public 
libraries, 
households, 
communes 
slugging, 
SETI@home, 
Couchsurfing, 
NeighborGoods 
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CHAPTER 2 
CURRENT AND FUTURE GAINS FROM SHARING 
2.1 Introduction 
While there are theoretical arguments for why we should expect substantially more sharing in the 
digital economy, theory alone cannot reveal the economic importance of sharing now or in the 
future.  This paper addresses three broad empirical questions:  What is the current value of 
decentralized sharing among relatives, friends, and neighbors?  What is the potential value of 
sharing on online platforms, and where are the largest gains most likely to be?  Finally, what is 
the relationship between income and sharing, and how should we expect economic growth to 
impact different forms of sharing in the long-run? 
Data on sharing are limited, leading Benkler to refer to it as the “dark matter of the 
economic production universe” (Benkler 2004, 337).  My empirical analysis sheds light on 
current and future gains from sharing using six sources of data: the General Social Survey (GSS), 
the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), the American Community Survey (ACS), the Center 
for a New American Dream survey (CNADS), my own survey of users of the sharing platform 
NeighborGoods (NGS), and anonymous user data from NeighborGoods.  In the following three 
sections I address the current value of sharing, the potential value of sharing, and the long-run 
effect of income on sharing.  Section 2.5 concludes with a synthesis of my main results and a 
discussion of directions for further research. 
 
2.2 The current value of decentralized sharing 
The value of sharing among closely-knit individuals within households is immense.  
Economists use household equivalence scales to compare the standard of living of households of 
 26 
different sizes.  The assumption is that people save money by sharing household public goods -- 
or, perhaps more accurately, quasi-public goods -- including living space vehicles, furniture, 
appliances, and utilities (as well as housework such as meal preparation and childcare).  Although 
economics pays little attention to sharing, economists routinely assume there are massive benefits 
to sharing within households.  Using the common square root scale, the 2010 ACS reveals that 
equivalent household income is about 70 percent greater than per capita income.  In other words, 
a standard equivalence scale suggests that about 40 percent of U.S. equivalized income can be 
attributed to sharing goods within households.  From this perspective, the value of borrowing and 
lending privately-owned goods across households will inevitably seem small.  Nevertheless, 
sharing items with non-household members may still represent one of the most important forms 
of inter-household cooperation.  Moreover, in an era of declining household size (Salcedo et al. 
2012), sharing among loosely-connected individuals may be increasingly important. 
 
2.2.1 Data and methodology 
I use data on how often people borrow and lend goods across households and the price of 
those goods to estimate the current value of decentralized sharing. The GSS provides self-
reported data on how frequently respondents lend goods with people in other households.  The 
survey’s 2002 and 2004 topical modules on altruism ask respondents how often they performed 
nine altruistic acts, including how often they “let someone [they] didn’t know very well borrow 
an item of some value like dishes.”  I pool data from the 2002 and 2004 surveys for a sample of 
2,712 people, and I convert the categorical values like “once a month” and “two or three times a 
year” to annual values following Einolf (2007).  Unfortunately, the GSS only asks people how 
often they share items with someone they do not know very well, because the module is focused 
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on altruism, not reciprocity.  Most decentralized borrowing and lending probably occurs within 
reciprocal networks of relatives, friends, and neighbors, but the GSS misses these transactions.  
To address this shortcoming of the GSS question, I designed and conducted my own 
online survey.  My survey consists of eighteen questions and takes about ten minutes to complete.  
Respondents had a one-in-fifty chance of winning a $100 Amazon gift card “to purchase 
something [they] (and [their] neighbors) need”.  The survey asks how often subjects borrow and 
lend items with people they do and do not know well.  The survey also asks users about their 
motivations and obstacles to sharing goods online.  The full survey is available in Appendix A.  
NeighborGoods emailed a link to the survey to 22,000 active and inactive members in August 
2013, and 333 people completed the survey, giving me a response rate of 1.5 percent.  Although 
this response rate is low, it is common for surveys of large online communities.  For example, 
Willer et al.’s survey of 47,492 Freecycle users achieved a response rate of 1.7 percent (Willer et 
al. 2012, Appendix A). 
Descriptive statistics for my NeighborGoods sample are quite similar to those for the 
GSS sample.  Respondents to my survey include slightly more men, are slightly younger, and live 
in slightly smaller households, as shown in Table 2.1.  Individuals in the two surveys report 
nearly identical levels of happiness.  The most significant discrepancy between the two samples is 
that my subjects report a mean household income that is 42 percent larger than GSS respondents 
in 2002 and 2004.  Despite the significant differences in income, my sample of NeighborGoods 
users is quite similar to the GSS’s nationally representative sample, which suggests that my 
results can be generalized to the U.S. as a whole. 
Like the GSS, my survey does not ask respondents to report the monetary value of each 
good they borrowed over the course of the last year.  I estimate the average gains from sharing 
using anonymous data from NeighborGoods.  This data provides information about 14,937 items 
posted on NeighborGoods and 1,281 items shared from March 2009 to November 2012.  When 
users add an item to their inventory, NeighborGoods asks them to list its value.  Table 2.1 lists the 
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median and mean value of goods that were posted and goods that were shared over this period.  I 
assume that the items people shared offline are similar to the items users shared on 
NeighborGoods.  If anything, the typical good shared among relatives, friends, and neighbors is 
probably worth more than the typical good shared on NeighborGoods. 
The next step is to translate the value of a good into the value of borrowing the good.  
There is ample data on the cost of purchasing goods but little data on how much it is worth to use 
a good for an hour, a day, or a week.  Rental markets are very thin for most household goods, so 
they do not provide a measure of the value of borrowing goods.  However, my survey asks users 
if they would “consider sharing more expensive items on NeighborGoods if lenders could charge 
a fee.”  Many users worry that allowing fees would undermine the cooperative spirit of the 
network, but 55 percent of respondents are amenable to the idea.  The survey asks those users to 
list specific goods they would be willing to borrow or lend for a fee, how much the goods are 
worth, and what rental fees they would be willing to pay or accept.  I interpret the willingness to 
pay for a rental good as the net benefit of sharing that good, given current norms and preferences.  
Borrowers and lenders have very similar ideas about the value of using a good.  It is worth more 
to borrow more valuable goods, but the proposed rental/asset price ratios decline as the value of 
the good increases.  Figure 2.1 shows the actual rental/asset price ratios that respondents would 
pay as borrowers and accept as lenders, as well as my estimates of the rental/asset price ratio for 
goods of any value.  My local polynomial estimator allows for a non-linear relationship between 
the variables, and it provides good estimates of the ratios near the endpoints.  My predicted ratios 
suggest that people are willing to pay 9.4 percent of the asset price to borrow an item worth $50, 
5.8 percent to borrow an item worth $500, and 1.9 percent to borrow an item worth $5,000. 
Rental companies often lend goods at significantly higher rental/asset price rates, which 
may explain why rental markets for most shareable goods are thin even though gains from peer-
to-peer sharing may be large.  For example, bike shops often rent $300 to $500 bicycles for $30 
to $50 a day (Citibike Resources), so the rental/asset price ratio is about 10 percent, rather than 
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the 5.8 to 6.4 percent that most people are willing to pay to borrow a good of that value.  The gap 
between the ratio rental companies charge and the ratio most individuals are willing to accept 
suggests there are significant gains from decentralized borrowing and lending.  I use the predicted 
rental/asset price ratios from the polynomial regression to assign a value to goods actually shared 
on NeighborGoods.  I estimate that the mean benefit of a good borrowed on NeighborGoods in 
my sample is $14.88.  I use this estimate to assign a monetary value to self-reported frequencies 
of sharing.  My results are discussed in the following section. 
 
2.2.2 Results 
According to my survey, 8 percent of Americans report lending an item of some value to 
someone they didn’t know very well once a month or more, which is consistent with the GSS and 
again suggests my sample is representative of the U.S. population.  Respondents to my survey 
report sharing with people they know well about five times as often as they report sharing with 
people they did not know well.  Table 2.3 shows that 35 percent report lending items to people 
they know well, and 29 percent report borrowing items from people they know well, at least once 
a month. 
Self-reported data is imperfect.  First, the wording of the questions probably misses 
occasions when people share some valuable goods, such as car trips or lodging.  Second, the 
question asks how often the respondent borrows and lends goods, so it may miss borrowing and 
lending by other members of the individuals’ household.  Third, people report lending items 
slightly more often than borrowing items.  While it is possible that respondents to my survey 
genuinely lend goods more often than they borrow them, it seems likely that they mildly 
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exaggerate how often they lend goods or how seldom they borrow goods.2  These three 
shortcomings of the data may all downwardly bias my estimates of households’ current gains 
from sharing. 
My survey finds that current levels of peer-to-peer sharing are economically significant 
for some Americans.  If the average gain from sharing is $14.88, as indicated by the 
NeighborGoods Survey, then borrowing goods is worth at least $179 annually to 30 percent of 
respondents, and it is worth at least $774 annually to 8 percent of respondents.  My estimates 
suggest that sharing goods is an important component of non-market cooperation between 
households.  The value of borrowing and lending goods can be compared to the value of time 
spent helping non-household children, helping non-household adults, and volunteering.  The 
American Time Use Survey reports how much time people spend on each of these activities.  I 
then value these forms of non-market work at $10 per hour, which is somewhat higher than 
Nancy Folbre’s lower-bound valuation of childcare time (Folbre 2008, 121-135) and consistent 
with Woods Bowman’s analysis of the value of volunteer time (Bowman 2009).  Table 2.4 
compares the value of sharing goods with the value of helping non-household members and 
formal volunteering.  Borrowing and lending goods across households may not be quite as 
valuable as the time people spend helping each other outside the market, but it is an important 
form of cooperation.  In the following section I will consider the potential benefits of sharing 
goods on online platforms like NeighborGoods, Airbnb, and RelayRides. 
 
                                                     
2 The data does suggest that decentralized sharing is fairly reciprocal.  The correlation 
between annualized measures estimates of lending to anyone and borrowing from anyone is 0.58. 
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2.3 The potential value of decentralized sharing 
The next task for this paper is to estimate the potential gains from sharing, if platforms are able to 
facilitate high levels of sharing between strangers.  I do this by calculating households’ 
expenditures on six categories of shareable goods.  This does not provide an exact estimate of the 
potential gains from sharing, but it does provide a rough upper bound on the amount of money 
households could save by borrowing, rather than purchasing, shareable goods.  The exercise also 
reveals which categories of goods promise the largest gains from sharing.  
 
2.3.1 Data and methodology 
As I note in Chapter 1, online platforms have had some success in facilitating borrowing 
and lending among weakly connected individuals.  Although there are good reasons to expect the 
sharing economy to expand in the years to come, it is not clear how many transactions these 
platforms will ultimately facilitate or how valuable the shared goods will be.  This makes it 
impossible to estimate the potential value of decentralized sharing in the same way I estimate the 
current value. 
Instead, I use the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) to calculate how much U.S. 
households spend on different categories of shareable goods.  I measure expenditures on 
shareable goods in the same way Salcedo et al. (2012) measure expenditures on household public 
goods.  I determine which Universal Classification Codes (UCCs) represent spending on the sort 
of goods that are most commonly shared on general platforms like NeighborGoods, such as tools, 
media, gear, electronics, and toys, as well as those goods that are usually shared on specialized 
platforms, such as lodging, vehicles, and pets.  My classification of 490 UCCs into six categories 
of shareable goods is listed in Appendix B. 
 32 
Clearly, no level of decentralized sharing can save households more money than they 
currently spend on shareable goods.  Still, current spending on shareable goods provides a rough 
upper-bound for the potential value created by online platforms.  Spending on shareable goods 
exaggerates some of the economic benefits of sharing and ignores others.  On the one hand, 
households cannot eliminate their expenditures on shareable goods because the gains from 
sharing are constrained by the utilization of goods.  Even if online platforms are able to exploit 
economies of scale, develop favorable norms, and promote pro-sharing preferences over time, 
there will still be some costs to sharing.  On the other hand, not all gains from sharing will result 
from people borrowing items they currently purchase, because people will also benefit from 
borrowing items they currently forego.  Despite these problems, average household expenditures 
on shareable goods provides a rough upper-bound on the potential gains from sharing, as well as 
information about which categories of goods promise the greatest gains from sharing. 
 
2.3.2 Results 
The CES reports that U.S. households spend an average of $820 a year on tools, media, 
gear, electronics, toys and other goods that are typical of the items shared on general platforms 
like NeighborGoods.  Even if these goods are highly underutilized, households could save no 
more than $820 a year by borrowing these goods instead of purchasing them.  It may be useful for 
designers of online platform to recognize that households spend a limited amount of money on 
the tools, media, gear, electronics, and toys that often clutter our homes.  The largest gains from 
sharing may lay elsewhere. 
Members of NeighborGoods occasionally borrow and lend other types of goods, 
including pets, vacation homes, lodging, and vehicles.  Table 2.5 lists households’ mean annual 
expenditure on each category of these goods, as well as platforms designed specifically for 
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sharing these goods.  On average, households spend $9,090 each year on all types of shareable 
goods.  Although it is impossible to say exactly how this upper bound translates into potential 
gains from sharing, it seems reasonable to conclude that the average households’ gains from 
sharing could exceed one thousand dollars annually, if people gain access to dense sharing 
networks with rules and etiquettes that are conducive to decentralized borrowing and lending.  In 
other words, peer-to-peer sharing could potentially become the most valuable component of inter-
household cooperation. 
Pets offer a particularly striking example of the potential gains from sharing.  The cover 
of The Economist’s March 9th-15th 2013 issue depicts a household that rents its lawnmower for $6 
a day, its surfboard for $80 a week, and its dog for $5 a walk.  The dog stands out as the only 
good for which it seems just as plausible for the “borrower” to charge the “lender” as vice versa.  
Many pet owners need someone to care for their pets when they leave town, and many people 
would like some animal company without the responsibility of owning a pet.  There are clear 
gains from “sharing” pets, even if is unclear who should pay whom.  
Table 2.5 shows that the largest potential gains from sharing are in transportation.  
Households spend an average of $7,397 on the fixed and variable costs of owning private 
vehicles, which accounts for 80 percent of all spending on shareable goods.  While car rental 
companies and taxi services provide centralized means for sharing vehicles, annual household 
expenditures on car rentals and taxis are just $31 and $28 respectively.  Peer-to-peer platforms 
like Blablacar, RelayRides, and UberPool facilitate ride-sharing and car-sharing.  It is not yet 
clear how successful these companies will be in the U.S., but research suggests that car-sharing 
will likely grow over time (Prettenthaler and Steininger 1999, 450-452).  Besides offering the 
largest potential economic benefits to households, ride-sharing and car-sharing reduce traffic 
congestion and demand for parking (Gorenflo and Eskandari-Qajar 2013). 
The average U.S. household spends $9,090 a year on shareable goods that some people 
already borrow and lend using online platforms.  This figure provides a rough upper bound on the 
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potential savings from decentralized sharing, and it leads me to conclude that peer-to-peer sharing 
could reasonably provide over one thousand dollars in value for the typical American household.  
While my analysis is limited to the U.S., the potential benefit of sharing goods on online 
platforms is probably on the same order of magnitude in other affluent countries with large stocks 
of shareable goods.  The economic gains from sharing are not limitless, as some proponents 
suggest, but they are significant – particularly in the context of stagnating household incomes. 
 
2.4 Economic growth and the future of sharing 
Even if the potential value of decentralized sharing is large, economic development is 
historically associated with reductions in many forms of sharing.  To some extent economic 
growth may reflect the escape from the Tragedy of the Commons and the triumph of individual 
self-interest.  People with greater buying power may also have less of an incentive to share quasi-
public goods.  Recall that Salcedo et al. (2012) argue that the reduction in average household size 
over the last 150 years is explained partly by the fact that higher wages increased the opportunity 
cost of managing relationships with “roommates”.  Economic growth may similarly lead to 
reduction in other forms of sharing, if the cost of sharing a good with one more person or 
engaging in one more transaction increases in income. 
A simple argument for why people with higher incomes are less likely to share emerges 
from Gary Becker’s 1965 “Theory on the Allocation of Time”.  In his model, households are 
“small factories” that combine labor and intermediate goods, such as time, food, and furniture, to 
produce final commodities, such as meals, bicycle rides, and sleep.  Everything else equal, 
individuals with higher wages will use production methods that are more goods-intensive and less 
time-intensive (Becker 1965, 513).  Becker uses his theory to explain American lifestyles in the 
1960s:   
 35 
Americans are supposed to be much more wasteful of food and other goods than 
persons in poorer countries, and much more conscious of time: they keep track of 
it continuously, make (and keep) appointments for specific minutes, rush about 
more, cook steaks and chops rather than time-consuming stews and so forth.  
They are simultaneously supposed to be wasteful of material goods and overly 
economical of immaterial time. Yet both allegations may be correct and not 
simply indicative of a strange American temperament because the market value 
of time is higher relative to the price of goods there than elsewhere. That is, the 
tendency to be economical about time and lavish about goods may be no 
paradox, but in part simply a reaction to a difference in relative costs (Becker 
1965, 514). 
One way in which individuals may substitute time for goods is by sharing items with others.  
However, if sharing goods is a time-intensive means of producing final commodities, Becker’s 
argument suggests that the practice will decline with wage growth. 
In empirical studies it is difficult to isolate the effect of income on the propensity to share 
quasi-public goods over time, because -- as I argue in Chapter 1 -- the costs of sharing vary with 
evolving norms and preferences.  However, it is possible to identify the relationship between 
individual income and sharing at a given point in time.  The cost of sharing will be greater for 
high-income people, if the practice is time-intensive or if privacy and independence are luxury 
goods.  As a result, the affluent may share quasi-public goods with fewer people and less 
frequently.  However, online platforms may make sharing less sensitive to income.  Purchasing 
secondhand goods on Craigslist or travelling with Airbnb or Couchsurfing requires no long-term 
commitments.  Although users can always convert pleasant interactions into lasting friendships, 
they can just as easily terminate unpleasant relationships and warn other group members.  The 
arm’s-length nature of these interactions may significantly reduce the cost of sharing with the 
marginal person. 
This section analyzes the effect of income on individuals’ use of various methods of 
sharing goods.  Online platforms arguably reduce the amount of time it takes to coordinate 
sharing, so these institutions may be attractive to people with both high and low opportunity costs 
of time.  I hypothesize that new institutions for sharing, unlike traditional institutions, are used at 
similar rates by people of all incomes.  If the rich as well as the poor use online platforms to share 
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goods, then Hal Varian’s simple forecasting rule suggests that these institutions may remain 
economically important even in the face of continued economic growth (McCafee 2015). 
 
2.4.1 Data and methodology 
This paper examines the relationship between income and various methods of sharing.  I 
use data from the American Community Survey, my own survey of NeighborGoods users, and 
Center for a New American Dream Survey.  Each poll provides multiple measures of how 
individuals share goods.  I distinguish between traditional and new institutions for sharing goods.  
The methods I deem traditional are: carpooling, shopping at thrift stores and garage sales, living 
with a non-relative, living in a multi-generational household, and sharing items with relatives, 
friends, and neighbors.  The methods I deem new are: exchanging goods on used merchandise 
websites like Craigslist, using peer-to-peer lodging platforms like Airbnb or Couchsurfing, 
making use of car-sharing services like Zipcar or RelayRides, and participating in bike-sharing 
programs like New York City’s Citibike.  Traditional forms of sharing are more time-intensive 
and rely on stronger social ties, while new forms are generally less time-intensive and function 
among loosely-connected individuals.  While all the traditional institutions developed before the 
advent of the internet, the new institutions make heavy use of it. 
My first source of data is the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS).  I use the Public 
Use Microdata, which provides information on almost 2 million American adults.  The ACS asks 
workers how they usually commuted to work in the previous week.  As shown in Table 2.6, 10 
percent of workers report carpooling to work – about twice as many as report taking mass 
transportation.  Carpooling provides many Americans with a way to substitute time for money if 
they have a housemate, neighbor, or coworkers with a similar commute.  The ACS also collects 
data on whether respondents live with non-relatives or live in multi-generational households, a 
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decision which may depend, in part, on economic factors.  I find that 8 percent of adults live with 
a non-relative besides an unmarried partner.  (I do not count unmarried partners as non-relatives, 
because the decision to live with a partner may have more to do with love than economics.  That 
said, including unmarried partners strengthens my key results.)  The ACS also reveals that 8 
percent of adults live in a multi-generational households, and there is very little overlap between 
adults living with non-relatives and those living in multi-generational households.     
My second data source is my own online survey of 298 NeighborGoods users described 
in Section 2.2.1, which provides data on how often people borrow and lend goods across 
households.  This paper simply uses the NeighborGoods Survey (NGS) for information on how 
often people informally share goods with others off the platform.  The NGS suggests that 38 
percent of adults lend out at least one item a month and 33 percent of adults borrow at least one 
item a month. 
My third source of data is a 2014 Center for a New American Dream survey (CNADS), 
which provides a unique look at how 1,646 Americans use one traditional institution and four 
new institutions for sharing goods.  I use CNADS data on how often people use thrift stores and 
garage sales, online secondhand markets like Craigslist, peer-to-peer lodging platforms like 
Airbnb and Couchsurfing, car-sharing services like Zipcar and RelayRides, and bike-sharing 
services like New York City’s Citibike.  Shopping at thrift stores and garage sales is quite time-
intensive, and I view these as traditional institutions for sharing goods.  On the other hand, the 
four new institutions are specifically designed to reduce the amount of time it takes to exchange 
used goods, find a place to spend the night, or borrow a car or bike.  Whether they facilitate peer-
to-peer transactions, like Craigslist, Airbnb, Couchsurfing, and RelayRides, or more centralized 
forms of sharing, like Zipcar and Citibike, these new platforms all work to promote cooperation 
among loosely-connected networks of people.  (Unlike car rental companies that clean and 
inspect their vehicles every time they are returned, Zipcar requires its customers to follow rules, 
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such as keeping it clean, transporting pets in carriers, and reporting damage, a dirty car, or low 
fuel before borrowing a car (Zipcar 2015).) 
Table 2.6 lists my ten dependent variables and the percent of adults who report using 
each form of sharing goods.  The ACS asks all respondents who they live with, and it asks 
workers how they usually commuted work in the previous week.  The NGS and CNADS ask 
respondents how frequently they use a given method of sharing goods.  I construct binary 
variables specifying whether a given individual reports using a method of sharing at least once a 
month or at least once a year, depending on how commonplace it is.  For example, I analyze how 
income affects the probability that someone uses Craigslist at least monthly, but I analyze how 
income affects the probability that someone uses Airbnb or Couchsurfing at least yearly. 
The ACS and CNADS are nationally representative surveys, which I analyze using the 
appropriate population weights, but the NGS is not.  Table 2.7 shows that the sample in the NGS 
is somewhat more male and somewhat younger than the adult American population as a whole.  
Despite these discrepancies, respondents report lending items to strangers at levels very similar to 
those found in the General Social Survey (Fremstad 2014, 18), so the levels of sharing reported in 
the NGS are probably representative of the American population. 
The exact measure of household income varies across surveys.  The ACS asks individuals 
to report their household income, though the Public Use Microdata is top-coded for very high 
earners.  The NGS and CNADS ask respondents to select their household income from a list of 
categories.  NGS respondents were given five categories, and CNADS respondents were given 
seven categories.  I assume each person’s household income is equal to their category midpoint.  
As Table 2.7 shows, the ACS and NGS find very similar income levels.  For unknown reasons, 
reported household income is significantly lower in the CNADS.  Since I focus on the 
relationship between income and sharing within each sample, differences across samples do not 
pose a large problem for my analysis. 
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This section compares relationship between income and sharing using traditional 
institutions to using new institutions.  I begin this analysis by simply calculating the fraction of 
American adults who regularly engage in each form of sharing across household income 
categories.  While these comparisons are informative, I will also use multivariate regressions to 
test my hypothesis that people with higher incomes are less likely to use traditional methods of 
sharing goods, but no less likely to use new methods.  For ease in interpretation, I present 
ordinary least squares estimates from a linear probability model, but my qualitative results are the 
same when I estimate a multivariate probit model.  I estimates the effect of household income on 
and individuals’ propensity to share goods after controlling for household size, age, gender, and 
race. 
Pr(sharingi) = β0 + β1ln(hh. incomei) + β2ln(hh. sizei) + β3agei + β4femalei + β5whitei + εi (1) 
Of crucial interest is the magnitude and precision of my estimate of β1, or the effect of income on 
the probability that an individual engages in a particular form of sharing at given level. 
 
2.4.2 Results 
I first analyze how the proportion of Americans who use each method of sharing varies 
across income categories.  While these comparisons do not control for other variables, they 
illustrate the magnitude of income’s impact and allow for non-linear effects.  Figure 2.2 shows 
the relationship between income and six traditional methods of sharing.  There is clear evidence 
that adults with higher household incomes are less likely to carpool to work.  Workers in the 
poorest households are nearly 40 percent more likely to carpool to work than those in the richest 
households.  People with higher incomes are also less likely shop at thrift stores or garage sales.  
This is consistent with Becker’s (1965) model if sharing goods is time-intensive.     
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It is less clear how household income affects the probability that someone is living with a 
non-relative or living in a multi-generational household.  There is evidence that households with 
incomes exceeding $150,000 are less likely to include unrelated members (besides unmarried 
partners).  However, the probability of living in a house with multiple generations increases 
substantially with household income.  Since multi-generation households are generally larger than 
typical households, this does not necessarily mean that the standard of living is actually higher in 
multi-generational households.  My regression analysis will test this relationship by controlling 
for household size. 
There is also some evidence that people with higher household incomes are less likely to 
share items with others.  Americans with the lowest incomes report borrowing items much more 
often than lending items, perhaps because they have little to offer.  Still, people with household 
incomes above $100,000 are the least likely to both borrow and lend items on a monthly basis. 
Next, I turn to four new methods of sharing goods: online secondhand markets like 
Craigslist, peer-to-peer lodging platforms like Airbnb and Couchsurfing, car-sharing services like 
Zipcar and RelayRides, and bike-sharing programs.  Figure 2.3 shows little correlation between 
income and the use in these new methods of sharing goods.  The reason for this could be that 
these new methods are not very time-intensive, making them attractive to both low- and high-
income people, as Becker’s (1965) model suggests.  Sharing goods among fluid networks of 
loosely-connected individuals might be also be attractive to a wider-range of people, as Benkler 
(2004) argues. 
Figure 2.2 presents preliminary evidence that traditional institutions for sharing goods are 
disproportionately used by the poor, whereas Figure 2.3 suggests that new institutions are used at 
similarly by people with all incomes.  My next step is to use a multivariate probit regression to 
estimate the impact of household income on an individual’s propensity to use a given method of 
sharing controlling for household size, age, gender, and race. 
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Table 2.8 presents my estimates of the determinants of traditional methods of sharing.  
Column (1) shows that the inverse relationship between carpooling and household income is 
highly statistically significant.  For the average worker, a one-unit increase in log household 
income reduces the probability that she will carpool to work by about 18 percent.  Column (2) 
shows that affluent are significantly less likely to shop at thrift stores or garage sales. 
My regression analysis finds strong evidence that people with higher incomes are less 
likely to live with non-relatives (besides unmarried partners) or with multiple generations.  For 
the average household, a one-unit increase in log income reduces the probability of living with 
non-relative by about 18 percent and it reduces the probability of living in a multiple generational 
household by only about 17 percent.  These results are consistent with Salcedo et al.’s (2012) 
theory that people with higher incomes will tend to avoid living with “roommates”. 
Finally, multivariate regressions provide some evidence that people with higher incomes 
are less likely to informally share goods across households.  The inverse relationship between 
household income and lending is not statistically significant, but the inverse relationship between 
household income and borrowing is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  In both cases 
the point estimates are large.  The results suggest that for the average person a one-unit increase 
in log household income reduces the probability of borrowing items at least monthly by 15 
percent and lending items at least monthly by 21 percent.   
My next task is to more carefully analyze the relationship between income and the use of 
new institutions for sharing goods.  Table 2.9 shows that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between income and the use of services like Craigslist, Airbnb and Couchsurfing, 
Zipcar and RelayRides, or Citibike.  The point estimates are also very small.  In the case of 
Craigslist -- the most popular of these new institutions -- a one unit increase in log income is 
associated with less than a 1 percent reduction in the probability of using Craigslist’s for sale 
section at least monthly. 
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As predicted, I find strong evidence that the propensity to rely on traditional institutions 
for sharing goods – from households, to carpools, to neighborhoods – declines with household 
income.  However, I find no evidence that the use of new institutions for sharing goods, including 
Craigslist, to Airbnb, and Zipcar, similarly declines with income.  My results are consistent with 
Becker’s (1965) model if traditional methods of sharing are time-intensive, but new institutions 
are not.  The multivariate analysis may also fit Benkler’s (2004) claim that many people may 
prefer to share goods on fluid and loosely-connected networks than to share them within closely-
knit communities. 
Before discussing my main results in greater detail, it is worthwhile to reflect on the 
impact of other variables on individuals’ propensity to share and a few robustness checks.  First, 
consider the effect of household size.  My preferred specification controls separately for 
household income and household size, which allows me to avoid making arbitrary assumptions 
about household economies of scale.  My estimates of the effect of household size fit my 
interpretation of the results.  Holding household income constant, I find strong evidence that 
increases in household size (and decreases in household members’ standard of living) are 
associated with greater use of traditional institutions for sharing goods.  However, I find no 
evidence that household size has a statistically significant impact on individuals’ use of new 
institutions for sharing goods.  These results fit my claim that the affluent are less likely to rely on 
old methods of sharing goods but just as likely as the poor to use new methods of sharing goods. 
As a robustness check, I calculate two further measures of individual’s income: (1) per 
capita household income and (2) equivalent household income using the square root scale.  I 
arrive at the same results when I regress sharing on either of these adjusted income measures, 
instead of controlling household income and household size separately.  People with a higher 
standard of living are less likely to use traditional institutions for sharing goods, but no less likely 
to use new institutions for sharing goods.  
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There is no indication in my results that either gender or race have consistent effects on 
individuals’ propensities to share, which provides an after-the-fact justification for my focus on 
income.  I do find some evidence that young people are more likely than their older counterparts 
to use new institutions for sharing goods.  For example, my estimates suggest that, on average, an 
extra 10 years in age reduces the probability of using Craigslist at least monthly by 15 percent.  
This does not contradict my hypotheses about the relationship between income and sharing, but it 
does suggest that the sharing economy will increase in importance if young people today continue 
to use online platforms at similar rates in the years to come. 
Finally, given the effect of age on the likelihood that a person practices some forms of 
sharing, I estimate a more flexible specification as another robustness check.  Instead of 
controlling for age linearly, I include dummy variables for five-year age cohorts.  My main 
results are qualitatively identical in this alternative specification.  In short, I find robust evidence 
for an inverse relationship between income and traditional methods of sharing, but no evidence of 
a relationship between income and new methods of sharing. 
My estimates suggest there is indeed an inverse relationship between income and six 
traditional methods of sharing.  However, not all forms of sharing decline with income.  I show 
that Americans with higher incomes are no less likely to use new services like Craigslist, Airbnb, 
Zipcar, or Citibike.  The reason for this may be that these forms of sharing less time-intensive 
than more traditional forms of sharing.  My results also suggest that the sharing economy may 
succeed in substantially increasing sharing levels over the long run, even in the face of steady 
economic growth. 
There are alternative explanations for the patterns documented in this paper.  A rival 
interpretation of my results is that low-income people are more amenable to all methods of 
sharing goods, but since they also have worse access to the internet, they are no more likely to use 
online platforms than their high-income counterparts.  The digital divide may be an important 
part of the story, but I am unable to control for internet access in my multivariate analysis.  If 
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inequality in internet access hides the inverse relationship between income and new sharing 
practices, it would cast some doubt on Benkler’s claim that cooperation on fluid networks is 
appealing to a wider range of people than cooperation within stable communities (Benkler 2004, 
343).  However, this interpretation would not necessarily conflict with my ultimate conclusion, 
that sharing levels are likely to increase over time.  After all, creating a role for internet access 
means that new institutions for sharing will continue to grow in importance as low-income 
Americans get connected to the internet. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The empirical evidence reviewed here supports the hypothesis that levels of sharing are 
likely to increase in the years to come.  First, using data on how often people borrow and lend 
goods across households, I estimate that this form of sharing is already worth at least $179 a year 
for 30 percent of Americans and at least $774 for 8 percent of Americans.  While informal 
sharing between households is not nearly as valuable as sharing within households, I show it is an 
important component of inter-household cooperation.  Second, I show that the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey finds that households spend an average of $9,090 a year on shareable goods, 
which suggests that the potential savings from greater decentralized sharing may be substantially 
larger.  My analysis concludes that the largest gains from sharing will probably come from 
increasing the utilization of privately-owned vehicles.  Third, I address the claim that sharing is 
passé in a world of continued economic growth.  While I do find evidence that high-income 
individuals are less likely to make use of traditional institutions for sharing, I find no evidence 
that they are less likely to use new institutions of sharing, like Craigslist, Couchsurfing, or Zipcar.  
Taken together, I conclude that the future of sharing on fluid networks of loosely-connected 
individuals is bright. 
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The sharing economy is fertile ground for further research.  Others could improve upon 
my estimates of the current and future value of sharing by conducting nationally-representative 
surveys of sharing activities.  More detailed surveys might ask subjects to list the items they share 
with relatives, friends, and neighbors.  Studies could separately estimate the current value of 
carpooling and hosting, which I ignore in Section 2.2.  Qualitative research might also shed light 
on the social costs and benefits of sharing goods. 
This chapter highlights the differences between traditional institutions for sharing goods, 
like households and thrift stores, and new institutions for sharing goods, like Craigslist and 
Airbnb.  In doing so it ignores the role of public institutions for sharing goods, such as libraries, 
parks, and mass transportation.  Unlike sharing economy platforms, which often charge users to 
access goods, public institutions often make goods available for free or at subsidized rates.  It 
may be surprising, then, that high-income people make greater use of libraries, parks, and mass 
transit than their low-income counterparts.  Appendix C suggests that this is because public 
institutions focus on serving high-income areas.  Further work could investigate the political 
economy of sharing quasi-public goods. 
Research is also needed on the environmental benefits of sharing.  My survey indicates 
that “reducing waste” is the most common motivation for participating on NeighborGoods.  Data 
from the EPA shows that US per-capita municipal solid waste grew steadily until 2000, when it 
peaked at 4.7 pounds per person per day before beginning a slow decline (Environmental 
Protection Agency 2011, Figure ES-1).  Careful analysis might reveal whether online platforms 
played a role in this reduction in waste.  I examine the effect of Craigslist’s market for 
secondhand goods on waste in Chapter 3. 
Finally, the sharing economy is generating new data to test hypotheses from behavioral 
economics in real-world settings.  The growth of online platforms will allow researchers to 
observe how people actually share goods.  Future studies may leverage big data to address 
fundamental questions about why people cooperate, when members contribute to groups, and 
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how reputations influence behavior.  In the years to come, researchers will not only evaluate the 
economic, social, and ecological impacts of the sharing economy, but also use data from the 
sharing economy to improve our understanding of human behavior. 
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2.6 Appendix A: Online survey of NeighborGoods users 
 
1. During the last 12 months, how often have you done each of the following things ON or OFF 
NeighborGoods?  
 
More than 
once a 
week 
Once a 
week 
Once a 
month 
At least 2 to 
3 times in the 
past year 
Once in 
the past 
year 
Not at all 
in the 
past year 
Let someone you DIDN'T 
KNOW WELL borrow an 
item of some value 
      
Let someone you KNEW 
WELL borrow an item of 
some value 
      
Borrowed an item of some 
value from someone you 
DIDN'T KNOW WELL 
      
Borrowed an item of some 
value from someone you 
KNEW WELL 
      
 
2. How important are the following motivations for participating on NeighborGoods?  
 
Very 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Not 
important 
Helping others    
Reducing waste    
Saving money    
Meeting new people    
Building community    
 
3. What are your main reasons for not borrowing more items on NeighborGoods?  
Check all that apply. 
There are not many NeighborGoods users in my area.  
There are not many items I want to borrow on NeighborGoods.  
It is more convenient for me to borrow items from people I know outside of NeighborGoods.  
I forget to check NeighborGoods' inventory when I need something.  
I am uncomfortable borrowing items from people I don't know.  
Other: 
 
4. Would you consider sharing more expensive items if you were protected in case of damage?  
 Yes  
 No  
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5. Would you consider sharing more expensive items on NeighborGoods if lenders could charge a 
fee?  
 Yes  
 No  
 
6. Can you list one item that you would be willing to lend to others on NeighborGoods for a fee?  
Item: 
Estimated price of the item: 
Fee you would charge: 
  
7. Can you list one item that you would be willing to borrow from someone on NeighborGoods 
for a fee?  
Item: 
Estimated price of the item: 
Fee you would pay: 
 
8. What is your preferred place to pick up and drop off goods?  
 At the lender's home  
 At the lender's office  
 In an open public place  
 Other:  
 
9. What would be the easiest way for you to communicate and manage sharing requests on 
NeighborGoods?  
 Website  
 Text messages  
 Mobile app  
 
10. Is NeighborGoods valuable enough that you would be willing to pay $1 a month for the 
service?  
 Yes  
 No  
 
We always appreciate your feedback, but you may skip this question if you like. 
11. How do you think NeighborGoods could be improved?  
 
12. What is your age?  
 
13. What is your gender?  
 Male  
 Female  
 
14. How many people, including yourself, live in your household?  
 1  
 2  
 3  
 4  
 5 or more  
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15. What was your total household income last year?  
 Under $20,000  
 $20,000 to $39,999  
 $40,000 to $59,999  
 $60,000 to $99,999  
 $100,000 or more  
 
16. How many years have you lived in your current neighborhood?  
 Less than 1 year  
 1 - 3 years  
 3 - 5 years  
 More than 5 years  
 
17. Taken all together, how would you say things are these days - would you say that you are 
very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?  
 Very happy  
 Pretty happy  
 Not too happy  
 
18. What is your email address?  
Winners of Amazon gift cards will be informed via email. After the raffle, all email addresses 
will be deleted. 
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2.7 Appendix B: Shareable goods in the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
UCC UCC description Category of shareable good 
Percent 
of total 
expen-
ditures 
470111 Gasoline Private vehicles (variable costs) 6.675 
500110 Vehicle insurance Private vehicles (fixed costs) 2.432 
450210 New trucks or vans (net outlay) Private vehicles (fixed costs) 1.952 
460110 Used cars (net outlay) Private vehicles (fixed costs) 1.795 
460901 Used trucks or vans (net outlay) Private vehicles (fixed costs) 1.759 
450110 New cars (net outlay) Private vehicles (fixed costs) 1.747 
210210 
Lodging away from home away from 
home on trips 
Lodging away from home 0.833 
480110 
Tires (new, used or recapped); 
replacement and mounting of tires, 
including tube replacement 
Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.402 
610320 
Pets, pet supplies and medicine for 
Pets 
Pets 0.398 
220212 
Same as 220211 - owned vacation 
home, vacation coops 
Vacation homes 0.357 
470113 Gasoline on out-of-town trips Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.350 
610110 
Toys, games, arts, crafts, tricycles, 
and battery powered riders 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.331 
510901 Truck or van finance charges Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.315 
520110 Vehicle registration state/local Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.304 
620420 Veterinarian expenses for Pets Pets 0.299 
450310 Basic lease charge (car lease) Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.265 
510110 Automobile finance charges Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.265 
220312 
Same as 220311 - owned vacation 
home; vacation coops 
Vacation homes 0.241 
490312 Lubrication and oil changes Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.212 
490413 Motor repair and replacement Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.183 
660110 
School books, supplies, and 
equipment for college 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.177 
490221 Brake work Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.169 
450410 Basic lease charge (truck/van lease) Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.162 
490311 Motor tune-up Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.147 
490318 
Repair tires and miscellaneous repair 
work, such as battery charge, wash, 
wax, repair and replacement of 
windshield wiper, wiper motor, 
heater, air conditioner, radio and 
antenna 
Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.142 
590230 Books not through book clubs Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.128 
480213 
Vehicle parts, equipment, and 
accessories 
Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.125 
470112 Diesel fuel Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.125 
320410 
Lawn mowing equipment and other 
yard machinery 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.124 
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590310 Magazine or newspaper subscription Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.117 
670902 
Rentals of books and equipment, and 
other school-related expenses 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.108 
600122 
Trailer-type or other attachable-type 
camper (net outlay) 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.101 
490211 Clutch and transmission repair Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.099 
620410 Pet services Pets 0.097 
520531 
Parking fees at garages, meters, and 
lots excl. fees that are costs of 
property ownership 
Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.095 
490412 Electrical system repair Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.084 
230152 
Repair and remodeling services 
(owned vacation) 
Vacation homes 0.080 
610230 Photographic equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.080 
490110 
Body work, painting, repair and 
replacement of upholstery, 
vinyl/convertible top, and glass, 
installation of carpet 
Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.075 
310220 Video cassettes, tapes, and discs Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.073 
320521 Small electrical kitchen appliances Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.073 
460902 
Used motorcycles, motor scooters, or 
mopeds (net outlay) 
Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.070 
600420 Hunting and fishing equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.069 
490231 Steering or front end repair Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.063 
450220 
New motorcycles, motor scooters, or 
mopeds (net outlay) 
Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.063 
490232 Cooling system repair Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.061 
520512 Auto rental on out-of-town trips Rental vehicles 0.059 
490313 
Front end alignment, wheel balance 
and rotation 
Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.054 
600310 Bicycles Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.053 
620912 
Rental of video cassettes, tapes, and 
discs 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.051 
310231 Video game software Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.051 
320420 Power tools Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.044 
320511 Electric floor cleaning equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.044 
310232 Video game hardware/accessories Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.044 
310230 
Video and computer game hardware 
and software 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.043 
260113 
Same as 260112 - owned vacation 
home; vacation condos and coops 
Vacation homes 0.040 
490900 Auto repair service policy Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.039 
230902 
Same as 230901 - owned vacation 
home; vacation condos and coops 
Vacation homes 0.037 
490411 Exhaust system repair Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.036 
310314 Digital audio players Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.036 
590410 Magazine or newspaper, single copy Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.035 
490319 Vehicle air conditioner repair Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.035 
220122 
Same as 220121 - owned vacation 
home, vacation coops 
Vacation homes 0.035 
310340 Records, CDs, audio tapes Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.034 
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520410 Vehicle inspection Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.033 
320150 
Barbeque grills and outdoor 
equipment 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.033 
600132 Boat with motor (net outlay) Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.030 
470211 Motor oil Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.029 
310210 VCR''s and video disc players Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.028 
310320 
Sound components, component 
systems, and compact disc sound 
systems 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.028 
320522 
Portable heating and cooling 
equipment 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.027 
320370 Non-electric cookware Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.027 
520310 Driver’s license Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.025 
480212 Vehicle products and services Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.024 
340901 
Rental or repair of equipment and 
other yard machinery, power and non-
power tools 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.023 
490212 Drive shaft and rear-end repair Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.023 
450313 Cash down payment (car lease) Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.021 
520511 Auto rental, excl. trips Rental vehicles 0.020 
430130 
Travel items, including luggage, and 
luggage carriers 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.019 
320320 China and other dinnerware Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.018 
520532 Parking fees on out-of-town trips Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.017 
320130 Infants? equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.017 
600410 Camping equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.017 
600430 Winter sports equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.017 
600121 
Boat without motor or non camper-
type trailer, such as for boat or cycle 
(net outlay) 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.016 
600902 Other sports equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.015 
450413 Cash down payment (truck/van lease) Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.015 
320902 Non-power tools Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.015 
490314 Shock absorber replacement Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.015 
210902 Ground rent - owned vacation home Vacation homes 0.014 
250213 
Gas, bottled or tank - owned vacation 
home 
Vacation homes 0.014 
620919 
Rental of other vehicles on out-of-
town trips 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.013 
470220 
Coolant/antifreeze, brake - 
transmission fluids, additives, and 
radiator/cooling system protectant 
(not purchased with tune-up) 
Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.013 
520550 
Towing charges (excl. contracted or 
pre-paid) 
Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.012 
600901 Water sports equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.012 
270413 
Same as 270412 - owned vacation 
home; vacation condos and coops 
Vacation homes 0.012 
520542 Tolls on out-of-town trips Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.012 
270213 
Same as 270212 - owned vacation 
home; vacation condos and coops 
Vacation homes 0.011 
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450414 Termination fee (truck/van lease) Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.009 
260213 
Same as 260212 - owned vacation 
home; vacation condos and coops 
Vacation homes 0.009 
590220 Books through book clubs Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.009 
520522 
Truck or van rental on out-of-town 
trips 
Rental vehicles 0.009 
260114 Electricity - rented vacation property Vacation homes 0.008 
510902 Motorcycle finance charges Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.008 
320310 Plastic dinnerware Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.007 
320340 Glassware Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.007 
320512 Sewing machines Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.007 
310311 Radio Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.007 
480214 
Vehicle audio equipment excluding 
labor 
Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.006 
520521 Truck or van rental, excl. trips Rental vehicles 0.006 
230142 
Same as 230141 - owned home and 
vacation home 
Vacation homes 0.005 
620904 
Rental and repair of musical 
instruments, supplies, and accessories 
(now includes pianos) 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.005 
880310 
Interest on line of credit home equity 
loan - owned vacation home 
Vacation homes 0.005 
340907 
Rental and installation of household 
equipment - see 300111-300332 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.005 
520560 Global positioning services Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.005 
320360 Serving pieces other than silver Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.004 
440140 Clothing rental Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.004 
390902 Girls’ other clothing, incl. costumes Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.004 
380903 
Women’s other clothing, incl. 
costumes 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.004 
450314 Termination fee (car lease) Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.004 
480215 Vehicle video equipment Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.004 
470212 Motor oil on out-of-town trips Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.004 
250113 
Same as 250112 - owned vacation 
home; vacation condos and coops 
Vacation homes 0.003 
420120 Sewing notions, patterns Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.003 
370902 Boys? other clothing, incl. costumes Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.003 
340908 
Rental of office equipment for non-
business use - see 320232, 690111, 
690119, 690120, 690210-690230 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.003 
230123 
Same as 230122 - owned vacation 
home; vacation condos and coops 
Vacation homes 0.003 
660310 
Encyclopedia and other sets of 
reference books 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.002 
660410 
School books, supplies, and 
equipment for vocational or technical 
school 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.002 
360902 Men’s other clothing, incl. costumes Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.002 
620905 
Rental and repair of photographic 
equipment 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.002 
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520907 
Rental of boat or non camper-type 
trailer, such as for boat or cycle on 
out-of-town trips 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.002 
310313 Tape recorder and player Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.001 
220314 
Interest on home equity loan - owned 
vacation home 
Vacation homes 0.001 
660901 
School books, supplies, and 
equipment for day care centers and 
nursery schools 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.001 
600110 Outboard motor Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.001 
340902 Rental of televisions Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.001 
240323 
Same as 240322 - owned vacation 
home 
Vacation homes 0.001 
240313 
Same as 240312 - owned vacation 
home 
Vacation homes 0.001 
220902 
Parking at owned vacation home, 
vacation condos and coops 
Vacation homes 0.001 
340905 
Rental of VCR, radio, and sound 
equipment - see 310210, 310311-
310330 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.001 
320350 Silver serving pieces Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.001 
270414 
Trash and garbage collection - rented 
vacation property 
Vacation homes 0.001 
620918 Rental of video software Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.000 
620917 Rental of video hardware/accessories Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.000 
240113 
Same as 240112 - owned vacation 
home 
Vacation homes 0.000 
620916 
Rental of video or computer hardware 
or software 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.000 
620906 
Rental of all boats and outboard 
motors 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.000 
520904 
Rental of non camper-type trailer, 
such as for boat or cycle 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.000 
320623 
Same as 320622 - owned vacation 
home 
Vacation homes 0.000 
270903 
Septic tank cleaning - owned vacation 
home 
Vacation homes 0.000 
240123 
Same as 240122 - owned vacation 
home 
Vacation homes 0.000 
240223 
Same as 240222 - owned vacation 
home 
Vacation homes 0.000 
-- 337 UCCs that are not shareable Uncategorized 74.566 
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2.8 Appendix C: Political economy of public institutions for sharing 
This chapter compares traditional institutions for sharing goods with new institutions for 
sharing goods.  In doing so, it ignores the role of public institutions.  Public transportation, 
libraries, and parks are three important ways in which people share valuable goods.  Using data 
from the ACS and CNADS, it is possible to analyze the impact of income on the use of these 
public institutions just as I do for traditional institutions and new institutions.  There is good 
reason to think that low-income people are more likely to use mass transit, libraries, and parks 
than high-income people.  After all, these services tend to require a significant amount of time.  
Moreover, public institutions are typically funded in part by government, which should make 
them especially attractive to the poor. 
Surprisingly, then, a first glance at the data suggests that the use of public institutions 
increases with income.  Figure 2.4 shows that people the affluent are disproportionately likely to 
use public libraries and public parks and playgrounds.  The case of mass transit is more complex.  
Mass-transit use appears to be U-shaped, so that workers living in the poorest and richest 
households are much more likely to use mass transportation than workers living in middle-
income households.  Controlling for household size, age, gender, and ethnicity sharpens the 
positive relationship between income and public methods of sharing.  Table 2.10 shows strong 
evidence that people with higher incomes are more likely to use mass transit, libraries, and parks.  
For example, I estimate that a one unit increase in log household income is associated with a 16 
percent increase in the likelihood that individuals use public parks at least once a month. 
At first these results may seem counter-intuitive, but I hypothesize that poor people are 
less likely to use public institutions for sharing goods because people living in poor 
neighborhoods and cities tend to have limited access to public goods.  For example, public 
transportation systems may be designed primarily to serve high-income neighborhoods, and 
neighborhoods with easy access to mass transit may become unaffordable for low-income people.  
 56 
In either case, the amount of time it takes to use mass transit may be higher for low-income 
people than high-income people, which could explain why they are less likely to use it, despite 
their low wages. 
I can test my hypothesis by focusing my analysis on the correlation between income and 
mass transit use within Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs).  Table 2.11 presents the results of 
OLS regressions estimating the determinants of mass transit use.  Column (1) replicates my 
original finding: nationwide American workers with higher incomes are more likely to take mass 
transit.  However, Column (2) shows that within PUMAs the relationship reverses.  In other 
words, the positive correlation between income and mass transit is driven entirely by the fact that 
workers in wealthier PUMAs are more likely to take mass transportation than workers in poorer 
PUMAs.  Within any given PUMA, where the availability of mass transportation is relatively 
constant, low-income Americans are disproportionately likely to make use of it.  As a robustness 
check, consider the case of carpooling.  Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.11 show that the negative 
relationship between income and carpooling is not impacted by including PUMA fixed effects, 
which is consistent with my interpretation of the results, if all Americans have similar access to 
roads. 
Note that if it were possible to run these regressions within even smaller geographical 
areas, the inverse relationship between income and mass transit use may be even greater.  After 
all the average PUMA contains almost half a million people, and some PUMAs have millions of 
people, so access to mass transit within PUMAs may still vary substantially with neighborhood 
wealth. 
Given the smaller size of the CNADS, it is impossible to test whether the positive 
relationship between income and the use of libraries and parks holds true within smaller 
geographical areas that have similar access to libraries and parks.  Nevertheless, the results from 
mass transportation suggest that people in affluent cities and neighborhoods may have 
systematically better access to public goods, which could explain why nationwide the rich are 
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disproportionately likely to use these public methods of sharing goods.  These findings highlight 
the role of political economy in determining how people distribute the costs and the benefits of 
sharing goods, although the issue falls beyond the scope of this paper. 
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2.9 Tables and figures 
 
 
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics for GSS and NeighborGoods samples 
  GSS sample  NeighborGoods sample 
 n Mean Min Max  n Mean Min Max 
Female 2,712 0.51 0 1  324 0.45 0 1 
Age 2,700 44.7 18 89  319 41.6 20 81 
Household size 2,712 2.74 1 11  323 2.60 1 5 
Household income 2,398 59,243 449 204,320  306 84,412 10,000 150,000 
Happiness 2,706 2.22 1 3  325 2.22 1 3 
Note: Variables definitions are as follows: female (male = 0, female = 1), household size ("5 
or more" = 5 for NG sample), household income (based on midpoints, in 2013 dollars), 
happiness (1 = "not too happy", 2 = "pretty happy", 3 = "very happy").  GSS means are 
weighted using sampling weights, NeighborGoods means are unweighted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Value of items on NeighborGoods 
  n Median value Mean value 
Posted goods 14,863 $60 $214 
Shared goods 1,243 $75 $466 
Notes: Author's calculations using anonymous data from 
NeighborGoods. 
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Figure 2.1: Actual and predicted rental/asset price ratios 
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Table 2.3: Current frequencies of sharing 
 
GSS 
Sample 
 NeighborGoods Sample 
 
lend to 
someone 
you didn't 
know 
well 
 
lend to 
someone 
you didn't 
know 
well 
lend to 
someone 
you knew 
well 
borrow 
from 
someone 
you didn't 
know 
well 
borrow 
from 
someone 
you knew 
well 
More than once a week 1%  1% 5% 0% 2% 
Once a week 1%  2% 8% 1% 5% 
Once a month 5%  5% 22% 4% 22% 
At least 2 to 3 times in the 
past year 
18%  12% 33% 9% 28% 
Once in the past year 17%  20% 9% 19% 16% 
Not at all in the past year 58%  60% 22% 67% 27% 
Total 100%  100% 100% 100% 100% 
Notes: Calculations use data from the General Social Survey and the author's survey of 
NeighborGoods users. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: The value of various forms of inter-household cooperation 
 
mean incidents 
per year 
mean minutes 
per day 
annual value* 
borrowing goods 9.5  $141 
lending goods 14.3  $213 
helping non-hh kids  4.5 $272 
helping non-hh adults  5.2 $316 
formal volunteering  9.7 $588 
Note: Data is from my survey and ATUS 2003-2012 sample means using 
person/day weights.  I assume that the mean value of sharing a good is $14.88 and 
that non-market work is worth $10 an hour. 
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Table 2.5: Household expenditures on shareable goods 
Categories of spending 
Mean annual 
expenditures 
Examples of non-
market platforms 
Examples of 
market platforms 
Tools, media, gear, etc. $820 NeighborGoods Sharetribe 
Pets $286  Rover 
Vacation homes $289 HomeExchange Airbnb 
Lodging away from home $298 CouchSurfing Airbnb 
Private vehicles (fixed costs) $3,994 
 
RelayRides,  
Private vehicles (variable costs) $3,403 BlaBlaCar 
All shareable goods $9,089   
Source: Consumer Expenditure Public Use Microdata 2011.  For more information on these 
platforms see Neighborgoods.net, Sharetribe.com, Rover.com, HomeExchange.com, 
Airbnb.com, Couchsurfing.com, Relayrides.com, and Blablacar.com. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.6: Use of various institutions for sharing goods 
Dependent variables: Type Source Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Usually carpooled to work last week (among 
workers) 
Traditional ACS 0.10 0.30 
Uses thrift stores or garage sales at least 
monthly 
Traditional CNAD 0.43 0.50 
Lives with a non-relative (besides an unmarried 
partner) 
Traditional ACS 0.08 0.28 
Lives in a multi-generational household Traditional ACS 0.08 0.26 
Lends item to anyone at least monthly Traditional NG 0.38 0.49 
Borrows item from anyone at least monthly Traditional NG 0.33 0.47 
Uses used merchandise website like Craigslist 
at least monthly 
New CNAD 0.31 0.46 
Uses peer-to-peer lodging services like Airbnb 
or Craigslist at least annually 
New CNAD 0.10 0.30 
Uses car-sharing service like Zipcar or 
RelayRides at least monthly 
New CNAD 0.06 0.24 
Uses bicycle sharing services at least annually New CNAD 0.09 0.28 
Note: All summary statistics use population weights, except NG survey. 
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Table 2.7: Comparisons of common variables 
 ACS NGS CNADS 
Female 0.52 0.43 0.52 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Age 45.74 41.01 45.95 
 (17.10) (12.13) (16.60) 
White 0.76 NA 0.77 
 (0.43) NA (0.42) 
Household size 3.45 2.60 2.67 
 (1.59) (1.18) (1.25) 
Household income 83,992 84,463 57,258 
 (75,907) (49,256) (45,835) 
Equivalent hh income 47,566 54,560 36,492 
   (using sqrt. scale) (44,320) (32,390) (28,596) 
Observations 1,820,352 298 1,646 
Population weights? Yes No Yes 
Survey year 2010 2013 2014 
 Notes on construction 
of income data 
Household 
income with 
topcoding. 
Household 
income based 
on midpoints 
from  5 
income 
brackets 
Household 
based on 
midpoints 
from 7 
income 
brackets. 
Notes:  Population means with standard deviations in parentheses.  All 
statistics use population weights, except the NGS, which is not nationally 
representative. 
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Figure 2.2: Household income and traditional methods of sharing 
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Figure 2.3: Household income and new methods of sharing 
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Table 2.8: Inverse relationship between income and traditional methods of sharing 
 
Usually 
carpooled to 
work last 
week 
Uses thrift 
store or 
garage sale 
at least 
monthly 
Lives with 
non-
relatives 
(besides 
partners)  
Lives in a 
multi-
generational 
household 
Lends 
item to 
anyone at 
least 
monthly 
Borrows 
item from 
anyone at 
least 
monthly 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(hh income) -0.0178*** -0.0551*** -0.0148*** -0.0127*** -0.0587 -0.0684* 
 (0.000415) (0.0179) (0.000286) (0.000217) (0.0378) (0.0366) 
Ln(hh size) 0.0558*** 0.0811*** 0.0643*** 0.203*** 0.134** 0.124** 
 (0.000640) (0.0307) (0.000514) (0.000581) (0.0615) (0.0570) 
Age -0.000468*** 0.000766 -0.00184*** 0.00179*** 0.00340 0.00220 
 (2.38e-05) (0.00100) (1.58e-05) (1.32e-05) (0.00233) (0.00228) 
Female -0.00465*** 0.0435 -0.0187*** 0.0233*** -0.0759 -0.0248 
 (0.000620) (0.0282) (0.000497) (0.000411) (0.0567) (0.0549) 
White -0.0228*** 0.133*** 0.00114* -0.0434***   
 (0.000832) (0.0345) (0.000651) (0.000588)   
Constant 0.276*** 0.791*** 0.277*** -0.0452*** 0.814* 0.904** 
 (0.00451) (0.192) (0.00319) (0.00233) (0.428) (0.413) 
Observations 1,319,635 1,646 2,273,619 2,273,619 298 298 
R-squared 0.014 0.025 0.041 0.154 0.032 0.023 
Population 
weights Yes 
Yes No No Yes Yes 
Note:  Estimates from Linear Probability Model with robust standard errors in parentheses.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.9: No Relationship between income and new methods of sharing 
 
Uses 
Craigslist at 
least 
monthly 
Uses Airbnb 
or 
Couchsurfing 
at least 
monthly 
Uses Zipcar  
or 
RelayRides 
at least 
monthly 
Uses bike-
sharing at 
least 
monthly 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(hh income) -0.00187 0.00681 -0.00760 0.00997 
 (0.0168) (0.0113) (0.00923) (0.00908) 
Ln(hh size) 0.0374 -0.0191 0.00939 -0.0120 
 (0.0296) (0.0226) (0.0156) (0.0182) 
Age -0.00470*** -0.00276*** -0.000572 -0.00192*** 
 (0.000956) (0.000812) (0.000520) (0.000605) 
Female -0.0110 -0.0127 -0.00775 -0.0436*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0190) (0.0151) (0.0162) 
White -0.0105 -0.0218 -0.0355* -0.0262 
 (0.0344) (0.0259) (0.0208) (0.0227) 
Constant 0.532*** 0.196 0.193* 0.125 
 (0.176) (0.128) (0.101) (0.107) 
Observations 1,646 1,646 1,646 1,646 
R-squared 0.035 0.024 0.008 0.022 
Population 
weights 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note:  Estimates from Linear Probability Model with robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 2.4: Household income and public methods of sharing 
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Table 2.10: Direct relationship between income and public 
methods of sharing 
 
Usually took 
mass transit 
to work last 
week 
Uses library 
at least 
monthly 
Uses parks at 
least monthly 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln(hh income) 0.00353*** 0.0449** 0.0869*** 
 (0.000357) (0.0176) (0.0172) 
Ln(hh size) -0.0137*** 0.0581** 0.0655** 
 (0.000542) (0.0296) (0.0298) 
Age -0.000610*** 3.84e-05 -0.00339*** 
 (1.89e-05) (0.00100) (0.000993) 
Female 0.00548*** 0.0839*** 0.0176 
 (0.000473) (0.0282) (0.0283) 
White -0.0713*** -0.00711 0.0306 
 (0.000757) (0.0353) (0.0361) 
Constant 0.102*** -0.106 -0.355* 
 (0.00385) (0.185) (0.183) 
Observations 1,319,635 1,646 1,646 
R-squared 0.021 0.019 0.043 
Population 
weights 
Yes Yes Yes 
Note:  Estimates from Linear Probability Model with robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.11: Household and area determinants of mass transit use and carpooling 
 
Usually took 
mass transit to 
work last week 
Usually took 
mass transit to 
work last week 
Usually 
carpooled to 
work last week 
Usually 
carpooled to 
work last week 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(hh income) 0.00353*** -0.000809** -0.0178*** -0.0162*** 
 (0.000357) (0.000338) (0.000415) (0.000424) 
Ln(hh size) -0.0137*** -0.00912*** 0.0558*** 0.0539*** 
 (0.000542) (0.000504) (0.000640) (0.000649) 
Age -0.000610*** -0.000491*** -0.000468*** -0.000473*** 
 (1.89e-05) (1.74e-05) (2.38e-05) (2.39e-05) 
Female 0.00548*** 0.00485*** -0.00465*** -0.00421*** 
 (0.000473) (0.000443) (0.000620) (0.000619) 
White -0.0713*** -0.0449*** -0.0228*** -0.0255*** 
 (0.000757) (0.000701) (0.000832) (0.000884) 
Constant 0.102*** 0.120*** 0.276*** 0.263*** 
 (0.00385) (0.00367) (0.00451) (0.00459) 
PUMA fixed 
effects 
No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1,319,635 1,319,635 1,319,635 1,319,635 
Population weights Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.021 0.135 0.014 0.018 
Note:  Estimates from OLS model with standard errors in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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CHAPTER 3 
DOES CRAIGSLIST REDUCE WASTE?   
EVIDENCE FROM CALIFORNIA AND FLORIDA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A number of online platforms have emerged in recent years to improve the allocation of 
durable goods.  Since the 1990s, Craigslist, eBay, and Freecycle have reduced the cost of buying, 
selling, and giving away secondhand items.  More recently, platforms like Airbnb and RelayRides 
have facilitated peer-to-peer rental of lodging and vehicles.  Some researchers stress the 
environmental benefits of increasing the utilization of consumer goods (Botsman and Rogers 
2010; Schor 2010, 137-143).  Most Americans agree that sharing goods reduces waste and 
environmental burdens (Center for a New American Dream 2014; Fremstad 2014, 23).  However, 
little research has attempted to measure the environmental benefits of these online platforms. 
This paper analyzes the impact of Craigslist on solid waste generation.  The platform has 
sharply reduced transaction costs in the market for secondhand goods.  Craigslist makes it easy 
for individuals to post items they would like to sell and search for items they would like to buy, 
and the website has attracted large numbers of users.  In 2014, 54 percent of Americans reported 
using “used merchandise websites such as Craigslist”, and 11 percent reported using such 
websites once a week or more (Center for a New American Dream 2014).  Economic theory 
suggests that a reduction in transaction costs in secondhand markets will increase the number of 
transactions and divert some goods from the solid waste stream.  Unlike eBay, Craigslist 
facilitates local exchange, so its gradual expansion in California and Florida from 1996 to 2009 
provides an opportunity to identify the platform’s impact on waste.  This paper exploits sharp 
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variation in when the platform entered various counties to estimate Craigslist’s impact on the 
solid waste disposal. 
Some recent studies have addressed how the internet has affected various markets.  There 
are clear theoretical arguments for why more efficient markets for consumer durables may reduce 
material throughput.  Valerie Thomas (2003) provides a simple model in which lower transaction 
costs in secondhand markets can lead to less waste, by raising incentives for owners to sell used 
goods rather than discard them.  In her model, the environmental benefit of falling transaction 
costs declines as the value of used goods increases, because consumers know they can resell new 
goods in the future.  However, this price effect is small when prices for used goods are low, as 
they are for many categories of secondhand goods (Thomas 2003, 75).  In related work, Thomas 
(2011) evaluates the environmental impact of the online market for secondhand books.  Her 
calculations suggest that buying a used book online saves twice as much energy as buying a new 
book printed on recycled paper.  Thomas’ theoretical and empirical work sheds light on the 
understudied relationship between secondhand markets, transaction costs, and waste. 
While economists have not addressed the internet’s impact on waste, they have studied 
how online markets affect the utilization of economic resources.  Kroft and Pope (2014) estimate 
the impact of Craigslist on local unemployment rates and apartment vacancy rates as the platform 
expanded across the United States.  Using data on the number of housing, job, personal, and for-
sale posts in 35 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in 2005 and 162 MSAs in 2007, Kroft and 
Pope perform difference-in-difference regressions of unemployment and apartment vacancy rates 
on the growth of Craigslist posts.  While they find no evidence that Craigslist impacted 
unemployment rates, they show that Craigslist reduced apartment vacancies by approximately 10 
percent over this time period (Kroft and Pope 2014, 289).  Their explanation is that Craigslist 
provides a better means of advertising housing than newspapers, because the website is 
searchable, posts are immediately accessible, and landlords can provide prospective renters with 
much more information about apartments (Kroft and Pope 2014, 297-298).  Kroft and Pope 
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conclude that Craigslist increased the utilization of rental housing by better matching landlords 
and tenants.  Although the paper does not consider the potential environmental benefits, it 
suggests that Craigslist increased the utilization of rental housing by roughly 1 percent, which 
may have reduced demand for new housing. 
Rapson and Schiraldi (2013) address the impact of the internet on the market for used 
cars in California.  They calculate the percent of households with internet at home in Californian 
counties using the Consumer Population Survey (CPS).  Using a difference-in-difference 
methodology, the authors estimate how internet penetration affects the quantity of used car 
registrations.  Rapson and Schiraldi conclude that, between 1997 and 2007, growing access to the 
internet increased the resale ratio by 7 percent.  The authors “remain intentionally agnostic” about 
why the internet caused this effect, but they note that “three channels stand out as plausible 
explanations: search costs, match quality, and asymmetric information” (Rapson and Schiraldi, 
2013: 234).  They argue that this reduction in transaction costs has private as well as public 
benefits.  Online markets for vehicles increase consumer surplus by better allocating used cars, 
and increasing the turnover of the vehicle fleet may also reduce carbon emissions (Rapson and 
Schiraldi, 2013: 234).  However, Rapson and Schiraldi do not attempt to directly measure the 
environmental impacts of the online market for cars.  
To my knowledge, no papers have estimated the impact of online markets on solid waste.  
A handful of papers do explain cross-sectional variations in solid waste generation.  Hockett et al. 
(1995) use county-level data from North Carolina, which is “relatively consistent with respect to 
collection and reporting methods” (216) to estimate the determinants of per capita solid waste.  
They find that retail sales and waste disposal fees are statistically significant cross-sectional 
determinants of waste generation, while demographic factors are insignificant. 
Much of the research on solid waste is conducted by government agencies.  Local 
governments do not report to the federal government how much solid waste they generate, but 
since the 1960s the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has estimated the solid waste 
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generation for the United States as a whole using a material flows methodology (Environmental 
Protection Agency 2011, 24).  The EPA estimates waste using data on the production, net import, 
and the lifetime of goods.  As Figure 3.1 illustrates, The EPA’s estimates of Municipal Solid 
Waste (MSW) suggest that the growth of pre-recycling waste slowed in the 1990s and declined 
slightly in the 2000s. 
It is not clear what accounts for this decline in pre-recycling waste, but the EPA 
highlights the potential role of “source reduction activities”, which include sharing and reusing 
durable goods (Environmental Protection Agency 2011, 128): 
Although source reduction has been an increasingly important aspect of 
municipal solid waste programs since the late 1980s, the goal of actually 
measuring how much source reduction has taken place – how much waste 
prevention there has been – has proved elusive…  Unlike recycling, where there 
are actual materials to weigh all through the process, measuring source reduction 
means trying to measure something that no longer exists (Environmental 
Protection Agency 2011, 132). 
This paper exploits variation in how Craigslist expanded in California and Florida to estimate its 
contribution to source reduction by better matching consumers to secondhand goods.  I then test 
the plausibility of my estimates by examining a sample of goods posted for sale on Craigslist. 
The EPA’s data does suggest that extending the life of durable goods could significantly 
reduce solid waste.  The EPA defines durable goods as products that last three years of more, 
including “large and small appliances, furniture and furnishings, carpets and rugs, rubber tires, 
lead-acid automotive batteries, consumer electronics, and other miscellaneous durable goods 
(e.g., luggage, sporting goods, miscellaneous household goods)” (Environmental Protection 
Agency 2011, 62).  The EPA estimates that durable goods constitute 24.6 percent of post-
recycling waste by weight (Environmental Protection Agency 2011, 10).  If Craigslist leads 
people to sell or give away goods instead of simply discarding them, the platform may cause a 
measurable decline in solid waste. 
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Next, I provide some historical background on Craigslist’s expansion in California and 
Florida.  Section 2.3 describes my data and empirical strategy.  In the following section, I present 
econometric evidence that Craigslist significantly reduces waste.  I test the robustness of my 
findings in Section 2.5, by estimating the platform’s impact on pre-recycling waste in Florida, 
allowing for county-specific trends in waste, and investigating the timing of Craigslist’s effect.  
My plausibility analysis uses data on the number and type of posts in the for-sale section of 
Craigslist to show that these posts can reasonably explain my econometric results.  My 
conclusion summarizes my argument and provides some avenues for further research. 
 
3.2 Background on Craigslist 
Craig Newmark created Craigslist in 1995 by establishing an email list for friends and 
acquaintances living in San Francisco.  Craigslist launched a public website for the San Francisco 
Bay Area in 1996.  The website provided a simple, searchable platform for people to post goods, 
jobs, housing, services, and personals, and Craigslist quickly attracted users.  In 2000, the 
platform launched lists for eight more American cities, including Los Angeles, San Diego, and 
Sacramento.  By 2009, Craigslist had hundreds of lists worldwide including 46 lists in California 
and Florida (Craigslist “Expansion” 2015). 
The largest section on Craigslist is devoted items for sale. For-sale posts are generally 
free.  Craigslist earns revenue by charging users for a few types of posts; for example it charges 
employers $25 and $75 to advertise jobs in some cities and $10 for brokered apartment rentals in 
New York City.  However, with the exception of automobile dealers, who pay $5 to post cars and 
trucks on the site, individuals and businesses can post items for sale on Craigslist at no cost 
(Craigslist “Posting Fees” 2015).  Unlike traditional newspaper classifieds, sellers may also 
provide detailed descriptions and pictures of goods. 
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Craigslist was not the first platform for exchanging used goods.  For example, the 
California Materials Exchange (CalMAX) was created in 1991 with the explicit goal of diverting 
waste from landfills.  The government-run exchange originally printed catalogs to match firms, 
agencies, and individuals with materials that would otherwise flow into the solid waste stream.  
CalMAX went online in 1994, and California claims that the platform diverted hundreds of 
thousands of tons of materials from landfills in the 1990s.  However, the public platform was 
gradually crowded out by popular, private platforms.  Today CalMAX directs its online visitors to 
Craigslist, Freecycle, and eBay (CalMAX 2014).  Freecycle is a smaller local network in which 
owners give items away for free, whereas eBay provides a national and international market for 
secondhand goods, in which sellers generally ship items to buyers.  However, Craigslist is the 
largest online market for local, secondhand goods in most U.S. cities. 
 
3.3 Data and methodology 
My empirical strategy exploits variation in how Craigslist expanded across the states of 
California and Florida from 1996 to 2009.  I combine annual data on post-recycling solid waste 
generation and information on when Craigslist launched lists in California and Florida.  Unlike 
most states, California and Florida have consistently collected county-level solid waste data for 
nearly two decades.  California’s electronic Disposal Reporting System (eDRS) recorded how 
many tons of solid waste originated in 57 Californian counties every quarter from 1995 to 2013.3  
Florida’s Solid Waste Annual Reports provide annual county-level data on post-recycling waste 
                                                     
3 The eDRS provides no solid waste data for Sutter County, which had a population of 
95,000 in 2010. 
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from 1995 to 2013 as well as data on pre-recycling waste from 1996 to 1999 and from 2001 to 
2013.   
This rich panel data allows me to identify the effect of Craigslist on solid waste 
generation using difference-in-difference methods.  I use solid waste to measure the utilization of 
durable goods in much the same way that Kroft and Pope use apartment vacancy rates and 
unemployment to measure the utilization of housing and labor.  The dependent variable for my 
analysis is daily per capita waste generation.  Over this period, mean post-recycling waste was 
about 5.6 pounds per person per day in both states, although the variation in waste disposal within 
counties is about twice as large in Florida as in California. 
There are several limitations to available waste data.  Ideally, I would analyze the impact 
of Craigslist on the disposal of durable goods, the category of waste most likely to be affected by 
the secondhand market.  To my knowledge, no state collects panel data with this level of detail.  I 
would also prefer to examine the impact of Craigslist on pre-recycling waste rather than post-
recycling waste, since Craigslist is unlikely to affect recycling rates.  While Florida does track 
both pre- and post-recycling waste in its counties, California only collects post-recycling data.  
This paper focuses on the determinants of post-recycling waste and uses Florida’s pre-recycling 
waste as a robustness check.  Table 3.2 shows that over this period Floridians generated about 7.6 
pounds per person per day, which implies a recycling rate of about 25 percent.  The shortcomings 
in my data are mitigated by the fact that California and Florida provide consistent data for 124 
counties over 19 years, allowing me to control for county and year fixed effects throughout my 
analysis. 
The key independent variable in my analysis is whether Craigslist was available to 
residents of a given county for the entire year.  I use data on when Craigslist launched each of its 
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46 lists in California, including 13 lists that were launched after Kroft and Pope’s study.4  
Although Craigslist does not generally name its lists after the counties it serves, I map each of its 
lists onto the main counties that use the list as shown in Table 3.1.  This allows me to estimate 
how Craigslist’s entry into a county affects that county’s per capita waste, after controlling for 
changes in waste in California and Florida.  My mapping is necessarily imperfect: some counties 
that “get Craigslist” may not generate many secondhand market transactions, while other counties 
that “do not get Craigslist” may make use of a nearby list.  Any error in my mapping leads to 
attenuation bias, reducing the magnitude and the statistical significance of my estimates of 
Craigslist’s effect on waste. 
Other online platforms may also have increased the utilization of goods and reduced 
waste.  I control for these possible effects using county-level data on the percentage of people 
with home internet access.  Following Rapson and Schiraldi, I collect county-level internet 
penetration data from the Current Population Survey (CPS).  The CPS asked respondents whether 
they had internet in their homes in October 1997, August 2000, September 2001, October 2003, 
October 2007, October 2009, October 2010, July 2011, and October 2012.  County-level internet 
penetration data is available for 60 counties for an average of 7.65 years.  Most of the variation in 
internet penetration occurs over time, rather than across counties, and I use the raw data to 
estimate internet penetration rates for missing county-years.  I do so in two steps.  First, I linearly 
interpolate internet penetration data for counties with original data, which provides me with 775 
observations and may also mitigate any measurement error in the CPS data.  Second, I impute 
internet penetration rates for all missing observations using predictive mean matching.  County-
year observations are matched with similar county-year observations based on their year, state, 
                                                     
4 I exclude the Reno/Tahoe list from my analysis, because it overwhelmingly serves 
Reno, Nevada. 
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population, population density, employment, and wages.  Table 3.2 presents the original CPS 
internet penetration data for 459 county-years as well as my imputed internet penetration data for 
the 2,275 county-years. 
Economic variables may also have a significant impact on solid waste generation.  The 
housing boom and the Great Recession may explain part of the trend in California and Florida’s 
daily per capita waste.  In my analysis, year fixed affects will control for general economic 
trends, but these events affected some counties more than others.  I use data from the Quarterly 
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) to control for total wages and employment.  I also 
include data on wages and employment in the construction industry, which is an important source 
of solid waste.  Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics for total wages per capita and construction 
wages per capita. 
I use standard two-way fixed effects models to estimate the impact of Craigslist on daily 
per capita waste in California.  My specification simply exploits variation in whether and when 
Craigslist entered each county. 
   Wc,t = αCLc,t + δXc,t + ηc + λt + εc,t   (1) 
This equation estimates the impact of Craigslist, CL, on daily per capita waste, W, while 
controlling for other variables, X, county fixed effects, ηc, and year fixed effects, λt.  CLc,t takes on 
a value of 1 if Craigslist was available in county, c, for the entire year, t.  This specification 
estimates the average effect of Craigslist on waste in all counties it entered.  I present my results 
in the following section. 
 
3.4 Results 
Between 1995 and 2013, solid waste generation declined in counties that Craigslist 
entered relative to those that it did not enter.  Figure 3.2 illustrates the trends in mean daily per 
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capita waste using population weights for counties in California and Florida that did and did not 
get Craigslist between 1996 and 2009.  According to my data, per capita waste peaked in 2005 
and has declined substantially since then. 
On average, counties that Craigslist entered over this period generated more waste per 
person than counties that did not get Craigslist, but they also achieved larger waste reductions 
over this period.  Indeed, daily per capita waste declined by over half a pound in counties that got 
Craigslist relative to those that did not get Craigslist between 1995 and 2013.  Figure 3.3 shows 
that this relative reduction in waste occurred as the fraction of residents living in counties with 
Craigslist grew.  My regression analysis tests whether Craigslist is responsible for all or part of 
the relative decline in waste illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
My econometric results are shown in Table 3.3.  All regressions include year and county 
fixed effects.  Column (2) adds controls for wages and column (3) adds controls for employment.  
Of my four economic variables, only total wages and total jobs are consistent and statistically 
significant determinants of waste, although they have opposite effects.  In column (4), I control 
for log population density and imputed internet penetration, neither of which is a statistically 
significant determinant of waste.   
The estimated coefficients in all four regressions are large, and they suggest that 
Craigslist reduced daily per capita waste about one-third of a pound.  Although the point 
estimates imply that Craigslist is responsible for about half of the relative decline in waste 
illustrated in Figure 3.3, they are not very precise.  Nevertheless, my estimates of Craigslist 
impact on waste are statistically significant at the 5% level in regressions (1), (2), and (3) and 
they are statistically significant at the 10% level in regression (4). 
In addition to choosing control variables based on economic intuition, I follow Belloni, 
Chernozhukov and Hansen’s (2014) data-driven procedure to select the best control variables 
from a set that includes all my variables from Table 3.3 as well as log population, county linear 
trends, and dummy variables for each county-year observation.  This double-selection LASSO 
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method selects different control variables from those I intuitively chose, but it generates a very 
similar estimate of Craigslist’s impact on waste.  In column (5) of Table 3.3 I show my post-
LASS0 regression produces a point estimate of -0.35 and a t-statistic of -1.81.  Again this 
suggests that my estimates of Craigslist’s impact on waste do not depend heavily on my selection 
of control variables in Specification (1). 
I also subject my point estimate in column (4) of Table 3.3 to a simple placebo test.  First 
I purge the waste data of the platform’s effect on waste, adding 0.35 pounds to daily per capita 
waste in county-years with Craigslist.  Then, instead of using information about when Craigslist 
actually launched lists in 78 counties, I randomly select 78 of my 124 to be treated with a placebo 
on a year uniformly distributed between 1996 and 2009.  I create 10,000 such placebo treatments.  
Finally, I estimate the effect of each of these placebo treatments on waste.  Figure 3.4 illustrates 
the distribution of my estimates of the placebo effect, which fit a normal distribution centered on 
0.  My actual point estimate from Table 3.3 is represented by the dotted line.  Only 193 (or 1.9%) 
of my placebo treatments are expected to reduce waste by as much as my estimate of Craigslist’s 
actual effect.  This exercise suggests that my results are unlikely to be generated by chance, and it 
provides additional support for my finding that Craigslist’s impact is both large and statistically 
significant. 
 
3.5 Robustness 
In this section, I test the robustness of my estimates.  First, I consider other explanations 
for why Craigslist may be correlated with waste reductions.  Specifically, I test whether my 
estimates could be driven by changes in recycling or other county-level policies to reduce waste 
generation.  Second, I conduct a double-selection post-LASSO estimation technique to choose the 
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most important control variables.  Third, I investigate the timing of Craigslist’s effect on waste to 
test whether it is consistent with my claim that Craigslist led to reductions in waste. 
 
3.5.1 Other explanations for waste reduction 
Between 1995 and 2013, other factors may have led to changes in counties’ waste 
disposal.  For example, some counties may have more vigorously pursued strategies to reduce 
waste, such as increasing recycling rates, establishing composting programs, or regulating 
construction and demolition waste.  It is also possible that one or more of these factors is 
correlated with Craigslist’s entry.  I test these possibilities in two ways.  First, I use Florida’s data 
on pre-recycling waste generation.  If my estimates in Table 3.3 are driven partly by changes in 
recycling, then Craigslist should have a smaller impact on pre-recycling waste than post-recycling 
waste.  Second, I test my specifications by allowing for linear county-specific trends in waste.  In 
these regressions, I allow for the possibility that – for whatever reason – some counties made 
faster progress than others in waste reduction. 
Table 3.4 compares my main result with an estimate using pre-recycling waste and 
another allowing for county-specific trends.  Column (2) suggests that Craigslist probably 
generated larger reductions in pre-recycling waste than post-recycling waste.  My point estimate 
implies that the platform reduced pre-recycling waste by 0.61 pounds per person per day, though 
the effect of Craigslist is not statistically significant.  It does not appear that different trends in 
recycling rates in treated and untreated counties are driving my results.  At least Florida, 
accounting for county-level changes in recycling would increase my estimate of Craigslist’s 
effect on waste. 
Column (3) presents my results when I include county-specific linear trends in my 
baseline specification and estimate the following equation: 
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  Wc,t = αCLc,t + δXc,t + ηc + λt + tηc + εc,t    (2) 
Specification (2) estimates the impact of Craigslist on waste, controlling for other variables, X, 
county and year fixed effects, ηc and λt, as well as county-specific linear trends, tηc.  My 
estimates suggest that the online marketplace diverted a large amount of waste from landfills, and 
the effect remains statistically significant at the 10% level.  This further suggests that Craigslist 
reduced waste in counties it entered, and that it did not merely enter counties that made greater 
progress towards waste reduction between 1995 and 2013. 
 
3.5.2 Timing 
My interpretation of my estimates in Table 3.3 is that Craigslist caused a decrease in 
waste disposal, probably by making it easier for people to sell items they would otherwise 
discard.  In this section I interrogate this claim by examining the timing of Craigslist’s supposed 
effect.  If my story is correct, then the effect should not precede the platform’s entry.  Moreover, 
the impact of Craigslist should probably grow over time, as more people adopt the platform, 
enabling it to better match secondhand goods with new owners. 
To examine the timing of Craigslist’s effect, I create indicator variables for the two years 
leading up to Craigslist’s entry, the first two years with Craigslist, and years three and on with 
Craigslist.  I interact each of these variables with internet density and estimate the following 
model: 
𝑊c,t =  ∑ α𝐶𝐿c,t+k  + β𝑋c,t + ηc + λt  +  εc,t
1
𝑘=−1     (3) 
Specification (3) estimates the effect of Craigslist over time, after controlling for other variables, 
X, and county and year fixed effects, ηc and λt.  I estimate this model for those counties that are 
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not observed at least three years before Craigslist’s entry, which excludes data from the San 
Francisco Bay Area. 
Table 3.5 presents my results for Specification (3).  I find little evidence of reductions in 
waste prior to Craigslist’s entry.  Recall that I do not consider a county treated unless it is 
available in a county for the entire year, so the average county is actually treated for about a 
quarter of the period “two years before CL”.  More importantly, this regression suggests that the 
platform’s effect increases over time.  Indeed, this analysis suggests that, on average, Craigslist 
reduced daily per capita waste by about half a pound in years three and on, an effect that is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. 
My results from Specification (1) appear to be robust.  Craigslist seems to reduce pre-
recycling waste as much as post-recycling waste and the platform’s effect on post-recycling waste 
is robust to the inclusion of county-specific trends.  Finally, the timing of the effect suggests 
Craigslist is responsible for the decline in waste.   
 
3.6 Plausibility 
This paper finds statistically significant evidence that Craigslist reduced solid waste 
generation as it expanded in California and Florida.  The point estimates from my preferred 
specification suggest that in California and Florida Craigslist reduced daily per capita waste by 
about 0.35 pounds in 2013 or 5.6 percent relative to 1995 levels.  However, my estimates are not 
very precise, and the 95% confidence interval suggests that Craigslist may have reduced waste by 
0.72 pounds or increased it by 0.01 pounds. 
To gauge the plausibility of my estimates, I examine the number and type of secondhand 
items posted for sale on Craigslist.  My analysis suggests that Californians and Floridians created 
roughly 140 million posts in the for-sale section of Craigslist in 2014.  For Craigslist to reduce 
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waste by as much as my point estimate, each post would need to divert 53 pounds from the solid 
waste stream.  Similarly, my 95% confidence intervals imply that each post reduced waste by 108 
pounds or increased waste by 2 pounds.   
I test the plausibility of this analysis by analyzing a proportional stratified random sample 
of 1,000 items posted on Craigslist’s 28 websites in California. All posts in the for-sale section of 
Craigslist are listed within one of 39 categories, the largest of which are furniture, cars & trucks, 
auto parts, electronics, and appliances.  However, not all these posts represent attempts by owners 
or dealers to sell (or give away) secondhand goods.  In my sample of 1,000 posts, 71 posts 
advertise new goods sold in bulk by businesses.  Another 131 posts are advertisements for large 
inventories, services, wanted items, businesses, property, or garage sales.  Finally, there are 10 
posts for pets, plants, or organic goods that are not exactly secondhand goods.  Still, most of the 
posts in my sample – 788 out of 1,000 posts – are advertisements for specific secondhand goods 
that Craigslist may divert from the solid waste stream.  Table 3.6 shows the largest categories of 
goods within Craigslist’s for-sale section, as well as the percent of posts within each category that 
I classify as advertisements for secondhand goods. 
The next step is to calculate the weight of the secondhand goods in my sample.  This is a 
difficult and time-consuming process.  Few advertisements state how much items weigh.  Some 
specify the model of the good, which allows me to find its exact weight online.  I estimate the 
weight of most goods based on descriptions, pictures, and the weight of similar items.  Some 
posts advertise multiple goods, such as a stroller and a car seat posted together in “baby & kid 
stuff” category.  In these cases, I sum the weights and prices of all items within the post.  (Recall, 
however, that I assign no weight to items being sold in garage sales.)   Although my estimates are 
approximate, they provide clear evidence on the relative weights of posts in different category of 
Craigslist.  For example, cars and trucks weigh tend to weight twenty times as much as furniture 
and appliances, which weigh ten times as much as clothing and computers, which weigh over ten 
times as much as cell phones and jewelry.  As a result, the mean weight of secondhand goods on 
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Craigslist depends largely on the proportion of posts within each of these categories, rather than 
the exact weight of goods within each category. 
Table 3.7 lists the mean asking price and the mean weight of secondhand goods 
advertised within each category of Craigslist.  For the sample as a whole, the mean weight is 717 
pounds.  In other words, my sample of 1,000 for-sale posts includes 788 ads for 282 tons of 
secondhand goods.  Clearly, not all of the items would enter the solid waste stream in the absence 
of Craigslist.  Consider the posts in the “cars & trucks” category, which comprise 14 percent of 
all posts for secondhand goods, and which weigh much more than most secondhand goods.  
Before Craigslist, the used car market depended largely on classified ads in newspapers, and the 
transaction costs in this market were significantly higher than they are today.  However, 
transaction costs were probably not so high that used vehicles were regularly salvaged rather than 
sold.  Rapson and 
Schiraldi (2013) do find that rising internet access substantially increased used vehicle 
sales in California, but more efficient used car markets did not necessarily increase the lifetime 
utilization of vehicles or reduce the flow of automobile waste.  Even if Craigslist did reduce on 
the disposal of vehicles, the average car and truck posted certainly did not reduce waste by 3,737 
pounds.  Similar arguments can be made for goods in other high-value categories. 
For my plausibility analysis, I assume that the Craigslist had no impact on the disposal of 
secondhand goods in the following six categories: Cars & trucks; Motorcycles/scooters; Heavy 
equipment; RVs; ATVs, UTVs, & snowmobiles; and Boats.  In my sample of 1,000 posts, 629 
are secondhand goods in the remaining categories and weigh a total of approximately 56,000 
pounds.  Not all items posted for-sale on Craigslist find a buyer.  Willer et al. (2012) conduct an 
online survey of Craigslist users, which suggests that 69 percent of posts are successful (Willer et 
al. 2012, Table 1).  Also, not all secondhand goods exchanged on Craigslist would otherwise 
have ended up in a landfill.  Craigslist has probably crowded out traditional methods of 
redistributing secondhand goods, such as thrift stores and garage sales, in the same way it 
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crowded out CalMAX, the materials exchange catalog and online platform established by the 
state of California.  Assuming that 50 percent of Craigslist transactions crowd out other methods 
for reallocating secondhand goods, the average post in the for-sale section of Craigslist reduces 
waste by 19 pounds.  If the actual rate of crowding is 90 percent, then the average for-sale post 
reduces waste by 4 pounds; if it is 10 percent, then the average post reduces waste by 35 pounds. 
My analysis of 1,000 random Craigslist posts suggests that the average post in the for-
sale section could reasonably reduce waste by 19 pounds.  Given the number of posts in 
California and Florida, Craigslist’s secondhand market could have reduced daily per capita waste 
by about 0.10 pounds in 2013 – less than my point estimate but well within my confidence 
intervals. 
I see two potential reasons for why my point estimates suggest Craigslist had a larger 
effect on waste than can be justified by the number and type of for-sale posts.  First, my 
plausibility analysis is built on the conservative assumption that the platform had no impact on 
the disposal of the heaviest categories of goods, and even small effects in these categories could 
lead to much larger waste reductions.  Second, my analysis ignores how other sections of 
Craigslist might impact solid waste.  Kroft and Pope (2014) find that Craigslist increased the 
utilization of rental housing by about 1 percent between 2005 and 2007.  If they are correct, the 
platform may have also reduced demand for new housing and prevented the associated 
construction and demolition waste.  However, an examination of all the channels through which 
Craigslist could affect waste generation is beyond the scope of this paper.  Posts for secondhand 
goods in the for-sale section of Craigslist could have plausibly reduced waste by a magnitude 
consistent with my results. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
The expansion of Craigslist in California and Florida provides some early evidence that 
its market for secondhand goods diverted a significant amount of solid waste from landfills.  
These results are fairly robust to the inclusion of county trends in waste, and the timing of 
Craigslist’s effect is consistent with my claim that the platform caused the reduction in waste.  A 
plausibility analysis suggests that Craigslist’s for-sale posts could be responsible for waste 
reductions within the confidence intervals of my estimates. 
My results are consistent with other recent research, including Kroft and Pope’s (2014) 
finding that Craigslist decreased apartment vacancy rates, and Rapson and Schiraldi’s (2013) 
report that online markets increased used vehicle sales.  However, this paper is unique in its 
attempt to directly estimate the environmental benefit of online markets for secondhand goods.  
My results suggest that Craigslist diverted hundreds of thousands of tons from the solid waste 
streams, saving the states hundreds of millions of dollars in waste collection and disposal costs.  
The environmental benefits of preventing the disposal of functional durable goods may be even 
larger in magnitude. 
Craigslist may have mitigated waste generation by the same magnitude as California’s 
glass bottle recycling programs without any public support or planning.  By making it easier for 
people to buy and sell used goods the online platform improved the matching of people with 
secondhand goods.  The success of Craigslist in changing the way people consume durable goods 
illustrates the power of online platforms to improve wellbeing while protecting environmental 
resources.  This does not delegitimize waste reduction strategies that require government action.  
On the contrary, it is possible that platforms like Craigslist would facilitate more transactions and 
divert more waste if they operated in conjunction with public campaigns to encourage people to 
buy and sell secondhand goods, similar to public campaigns to promote recycling.   
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There are many avenues for further research into the environmental benefits of online 
markets.  Economists could build on the model developed by Thomas (2003) to improve our 
understanding of the relationship between transaction costs, material throughput, and waste.  As 
Thomas’s model highlights, the ability to easily resell a durable good decreases the effective cost 
of purchasing it new.  However, her model does not include a budget constrain, so it does not 
address how people allocate their savings from participating in the secondhand market (as both 
buyers and sellers) towards new goods, services, or leisure.  More complete models may allow us 
predict the economic and environmental consequences of more efficient secondhand markets as 
well as new rental markets for durable goods. 
This paper warrants further empirical research on the relationship between online 
platforms and waste.  High-quality waste data is in short supply, but it may be possible to apply 
my methodology to some other states.  Historical data describing Craigslist’s market for 
secondhand goods is sparse, but researchers could begin to collect information about online 
markets for used goods in the same way they collect data about the online market for jobs.   
Another avenue for studying Craigslist may be to survey users who post items for sale.  
An online survey could collect information on whether, when, and at what price a particular item 
was sold.  Respondents could also report what they would have done with the item they posted if 
it had not sold on Craigslist.  Researchers might also study secondhand markets by focusing on 
their impact on markets for new goods.  If my results are correct, then it seems possible that 
Craigslist reduced demand for some categories of new goods, such as furniture. 
I hope that this paper encourages environmentalists, policymakers, and social 
entrepreneurs to think more about how we can harness the internet to increase the use and reuse 
of durable goods.  Craigslist’s success should provide some inspiration to the founders and users 
of smaller online platforms for sharing goods.  A decade ago, most Americans did not expect that 
they would be regularly using an anonymous website to find jobs, housing, and secondhand 
goods, but today most Americans do.  In another ten years, Americans may be using an array of 
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platforms that allow us substantially increase the utilization of consumer durables – from lodging 
and vehicles to tools and gear.  My analysis of Craigslist provides some reason to think that these 
online platforms may simultaneously raise living standards and mitigate environmental burdens. 
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3.8 Tables and figures 
Figure 3.1: Trends in per capita solid waste generation in the United States 
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Table 3.1: Craigslist's expansion in California and Florida 
Yr. entry Craigslist Counties served State 
1996 SF Bay Area 
Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San 
Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara 
CA 
2000 Los Angeles Los Angeles CA 
2000 San Diego San Diego CA 
2000 Sacramento Sacramento, Yolo CA 
2002 South Florida Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach FL 
2003 Tampa Bay Area 
Hernando, Hillsborough, Pasco, 
Pinellas 
FL 
2004 Fresno Fresno, Madera CA 
2004 Orlando Lake, Orange, Osceola, Seminole FL 
2004 Santa Barbara Santa Barbara CA 
2005 Bakersfield Kern CA 
2005 Jacksonville Baker, Clay, Duval, Nassau, St. Johns FL 
2005 Stockton San Joaquin CA 
2005 Modesto Stanislaus CA 
2005 Chico Butte CA 
2005 Ft. Myers / SW Florida Lee FL 
2005 Redding Shasta CA 
2005 San Luis Obispo San Luis Obispo CA 
2005 Tallahassee Gadsden, Jefferson, Leon, Wakulla FL 
2005 Pensacola Escambia, Santa Rosa FL 
2006 Gainesville Alachua, Gilchrist FL 
2006 Panama City Bay, Gulf FL 
2006 Ventura Ventura CA 
2006 Treasure Coast Martin, St. Lucie FL 
2006 Daytona Beach Flagler, Volusia FL 
2006 Merced Merced CA 
2006 Sarasota-Bradenton Manatee, Sarasota FL 
2006 Ocala Marion FL 
2006 Gold Country Amador, Calaveras, Tuolumne CA 
2006 Inland Empire Riverside, San Bernardino CA 
2006 Orange County Orange CA 
2006 Visalia-Tulare Tulare CA 
2006 Space Coast Brevard FL 
2006 Lakeland Polk FL 
2008 Imperial County Imperial CA 
2008 Mendocino County Mendocino CA 
2008 Monterey Bay Monterey CA 
2008 Yuba-Sutter Yuba CA 
2008 SF Bay Area Santa Cruz CA 
2008 Florida Keys Monroe FL 
2009 Hanford-Corcoran Kings CA 
2009 Humboldt County Humboldt CA 
2009 Siskiyou County Siskiyou CA 
2009 Susanville Lassen CA 
2009 North Central FL Columbia FL 
2009 Okaloosa / Walton Okaloosa, Walton FL 
2009 Heartland Florida Highlands FL 
Source: Craigslist https://www.craigslist.org/about/expansion  
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for key variables 
Variable  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max  Observations 
Daily waste, post recycling overall 5.64 2.78 0.20 65.89  N = 2356 
   in pounds/person/day between  2.02 1.94 15.13  n = 124 
 within  1.92 -6.78 56.39  T = 19 
        
Daily waste, pre recycling overall 7.56 4.04 1.12 72.58  N = 1139 
   in pounds/person/day between  3.07 2.25 19.62  n =  67 
   (Florida only) within  2.65 -7.13 60.52  T =  17 
        
Internet penetration (raw) overall 0.64 0.21 0.00 0.99  N = 459 
 between  0.09 0.38 0.82  n =  60 
 within  0.19 0.03 0.97  T =  7.65 
        
Int. pen. (imputed) overall 0.56 0.24 0.00 0.99  N = 2275 
 between  0.06 0.35 0.72  n =  124 
 within  0.23 -0.05 1.03  T-bar = 18.3 
        
Log population density overall 4.69 1.69 0.40 9.78  N = 2356 
 between  1.69 0.48 9.72  n =  124 
 within  0.10 4.10 5.15  T =  19 
        
Log internet density overall 2.71 1.60 0.00 8.99  N = 2275 
 between  1.10 0.27 6.07  n =  124 
 within  1.18 -2.09 5.63  T-bar = 18.3 
        
Total wages per capita overall 2,786 1,636 548 15,798  N = 2356 
 between  1,534 805 11,343  n = 124 
 within  582 -1,461 7,345  T = 19 
        
Con. wages per capita overall 166 108 8 811  N = 2275 
 between  90 21 424  n =  124 
 within  60 -58 553  T-bar = 18.3 
        
Total jobs per 1000 pop. overall 336 108 97 981  N = 2356 
 between  105 115 720  n = 124 
 within  26 96 597  T = 19 
        
Con. jobs per 1000 pop. overall 19 10 2 75  N = 2275 
 between  8 4 45  n = 124 
 within  5 -5 59  T-bar = 18.3 
Notes: This table lists unweighted means and standard deviations for key variables.  Some data are 
available for limited county-quarters.  Waste data is from California's eDRS and Florida's Annual 
Waste Reports, internet data is from the CPS, and employment and wage data are from the QCEW. 
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Figure 3.2: Relative decline in post-recycling solid waste  
in CA and FL counties that get Craigslist 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Relative decline in waste and the expansion of Craigslist in CA and FL 
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Table 3.3: Effect of Craigslist on daily per capita waste 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Craigslist -0.568*** -0.374** -0.362** -0.356* -0.350* 
 (0.215) (0.176) (0.178) (0.186) (0.194) 
Con. wages per capita  0.00546*** 0.00395 0.00415 . 
  (0.00154) (0.00269) (0.00262) . 
Total wages per capita  -0.000417*** -0.000475*** -0.000494*** . 
  (0.000102) (0.000101) (9.62e-05) . 
Con. jobs per 1000 pop   0.00548 0.00239 . 
   (0.0250) (0.0244) . 
Total jobs per 1000 pop   0.00691** 0.00693** . 
   (0.00305) (0.00299) . 
Log population density    -0.210 . 
    (0.690) . 
Imputed Internet    
penetration 
   0.519 . 
   (0.381) . 
Years used All All All All All 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
County fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2,356 2,275 2,275 2,275 2,275 
R-squared 0.598 0.676 0.678 0.678 0.675 
Notes: OLS regressions of daily per capita waste on Craigslist and control variables.  Columns (2) 
through (4) report estimates of intuitive control variables.  Column (5) reports double-selection post-
LASSO estimates.  This procedure chose a set of control variables from my intuitive controls as well as 
ln(population), ln(pop density)*internet penetration, 124 county-specific linear trends, and 2,275 
observation dummies.  County-cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 3.4: Placebo tests 
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Table 3.4: Robustness of Craigslist’s impact on waste 
 
Post-
recycling 
waste 
Pre-
recycling 
waste 
Post-
recycling 
waste 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Craigslist -0.356* -0.614 -0.397* 
 (0.186) (0.402) (0.229) 
Con. wages per capita 0.00415 0.0104* 0.00604 
 (0.00262) (0.00547) (0.00369) 
Total wages per capita -0.000494*** -0.000472 8.66e-06 
 (9.62e-05) (0.000595) (0.000192) 
Con. jobs per 1000 pop 0.00239 -0.0658 -0.0141 
 (0.0244) (0.0460) (0.0369) 
Total jobs per 1000 pop 0.00693** 0.00729 -8.47e-05 
 (0.00299) (0.00572) (0.00411) 
Log population density -0.210 -1.043 3.852 
 (0.690) (1.119) (3.828) 
Imputed Internet 0.519 0.427 0.367 
   penetration (0.381) (0.943) (0.387) 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y 
County fixed effects Y Y Y 
County linear trends N N Y 
Data used All Florida All 
Observations 2,275 1,097 2,275 
R-squared 0.678 0.695 0.714 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
  
 98 
Table 3.5: Timing Craigslist's effect on waste 
  (1) 
Two years before CL -0.0709 
 (0.236) 
First two years with CL -0.336 
 (0.230) 
Years three and on with CL -0.508* 
 (0.258) 
Controls Y 
Quarter fixed effects Y 
County fixed effects Y 
Observations 2,142 
R-squared 0.679 
Notes: These OLS regressions excludes 
counties that are not observed at least 3 years 
prior to Craigslist's entry. Control variables are 
total wages and employment, construction 
wages and employment, population density, 
and internet penetration.  County-cluster-robust 
standard errors are in parentheses.    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6: For-sale posts on Craigslist in California 
CL for-sale categories 
Percent of all 
for-sale posts 
Percent of posts in 
category advertising 
secondhand goods 
Furniture 14% 65% 
Cars & trucks 11% 98% 
Auto parts 9% 85% 
Electronics 6% 88% 
General 5% 79% 
Appliances 5% 76% 
Baby & kid stuff 4% 95% 
Sporting goods 4% 76% 
Computers 4% 69% 
Household items 3% 82% 
Clothing & accessories 3% 93% 
Other 34% 74% 
Note: Based on author's proportionate stratified random sample of 
1,000 postings across 28 lists in California. 
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Table 3.7: Secondhand goods posted for sale on Craigslist in CA 
Category 
Percent of 
all posts for 
secondhand 
goods 
Mean 
asking 
price 
St. dev. 
asking 
price 
Mean 
weight 
(in 
lbs.) 
St. dev. 
weight 
(in lbs.) 
Cars & trucks 14.1% $8,307 $9,005 3,737 1,105 
Furniture 12.3% $348 $1,052 155 211 
Auto parts 9.5% $327 $628 103 165 
Electronics 7.4% $248 $617 45 111 
Baby & kid stuff 4.8% $57 $83 71 322 
Appliances 4.6% $342 $540 173 116 
Sporting goods 3.7% $179 $207 77 193 
General 3.6% $574 $1,609 297 646 
Clothing & accessories 3.3% $88 $79 8 10 
Tools 3.2% $190 $483 57 110 
Household items 3.0% $77 $83 33 43 
Computers 2.9% $213 $301 10 9 
Collectibles 2.7% $156 $234 9 8 
Musical instruments 2.4% $427 $510 96 127 
Motorcycles/scooters 2.0% $4,579 $3,926 417 228 
Bicycles 1.9% $374 $564 38 15 
Books & magazines 1.6% $31 $32 7 7 
Tickets 1.4% $161 $123 0 0 
Antiques 1.4% $353 $610 55 65 
Materials 1.3% $354 $286 167 149 
Cell phones 1.3% $199 $153 1 0 
Motorcycle parts & accs. 1.3% $184 $297 21 30 
Jewelry 1.3% $258 $384 0 0 
Video gaming 1.1% $78 $54 7 5 
Toys & games 1.1% $229 $233 17 21 
Farm & garden 1.0% $454 $593 137 198 
Arts & crafts 1.0% $119 $197 16 10 
Business/commercial 0.9% $1,015 $2,062 173 225 
Heavy equipment 0.9% $9,093 $12,455 5,219 7,783 
CDs/DVDs/VHS 0.8% $49 $34 21 39 
Photo/video 0.6% $191 $234 16 18 
RVs 0.5% $6,617 $6,178 12,250 5,560 
ATVs, UTVs, snowmobiles 0.4% $708 $711 287 220 
Boats 0.4% $3,908 $5,248 523 846 
Health & beauty 0.4% $288 $443 108 166 
All secondhand goods 100.0% $1,549 $4,597 717 1805 
Notes: Based on author's proportionate stratified random sample of 1,000 postings 
across 28 lists in California.  These figures are for the 788 posts that I classify as 
secondhand goods. 
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